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In the late 1960's, the Supreme Court engineered a paradigm
shift in Fourth Amendment law: instead of focusing solely on
property interests in determining whether or not a "search" had
occurred,' the Court broadened the scope of the Amendment's
protection to include any activity in which an individual has a
"reasonable expectation of privacy." In United States v. Katz, 3 which
et out this new test, the Court cited numerous reasons for this shift.
* Acting Assistant Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. I would
like to thank Peggy Davis, Karin Ciano, Kris Franklin, Justine Daniels, Amanda Wood,
and the Lawyering Program at New York University School of Law for their feedback and
support.
1. In the twisted parlance of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the key question is
whether or not a "search" has taken place. Once there is a "search," it is presumptively
"unreasonable" unless the government obtained a warrant or one of the numerous
exceptions applies. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001) ("One might
think that the new validating public rationale would be that examining the portion of a
house that is in plain public view, while it is a 'search' despite the absence of trespass, is
not an 'unreasonable' one under the Fourth Amendment. But in fact we have held that
visual observation is no 'search' at all-perhaps in order to preserve somewhat more intact
our doctrine that warrantless searches are presumptively unconstitutional.") (citations
omitted). This article will generally use the word "search" in this narrower, technical
sense-that is, meaning any government surveillance, observation, or examination
pursuant to an investigation which implicates the Fourth Amendment. Generally, the
article will use the term "surveillance" to describe government investigatory actions which
have not been found to be a "search."
2. See United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(enunciating the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test). See also Osborn v. United
States, 385 U.S. 323,330 (1966) (allowing use of a "wired" informer only if a warrant were
first issued by a neutral magistrate); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63-64 (1967)
(striking down a New York state law authorizing eavesdropping warrants as overbroad).
3. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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First, the Court noted that the location of a person's activity should
not be the primary factor in determining whether or not the activity
deserves Fourth Amendment protection: in modem society, many
activities that formerly might have been able to take place in the
privacy of our homes now take place in semi-public areas-thus the
famous (if ultimately unhelpful) declaration that the Fourth
Amendment "protects people, not places., 4 Second, the Court was
beginning to realize that in an age where pure information was
becoming more valuable as a commodity, the Fourth Amendment
must protect private speech and conversations as well as more
tangible possessions.5 But primarily, the Court was acknowledging
the fact that given the new technologies available in government
investigations, a consideration of how the government agents (or their
devices) carried out surveillance was no longer a meaningful factor.'
4. Id at 351. Justice Stewart further noted that "what [a person] seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Id. at
351-52. He later intimated that modern life involves engaging in private activities in many
places outside the home: "No less than an individual in a business office, in a friend's
apartment, or in a taxicab, a person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of
the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 352 (footnotes omitted). This shift in the nature of
twentieth-century life was recognized by some members of the Court as far back as 1942,
when Justice Murphy wrote that "[wjith the passing of the years since 1787, marked
changes have ensued in the ways of conducting business and personal affairs. Many
transactions of a business or personal character that in the eighteenth century were
conducted at home are now carried on in business offices away from the home." Goldman
v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 138 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting). As one commentator
noted, social and economic changes mandated this shift in perspective:
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, limitations upon police invasions of
property interests offered adequate protection for a predominantly rural
population whose lives and aspirations were largely confined within the physical
limits of their property. That was no longer true of a twentieth-century
population whose endeavors are rarely contiguous with its property holdings.
Few [modem] Americans work on their own property or out of their homes.
Minimal participation in modern life requires extensive contacts which take us
beyond the four comers of our property.
Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First Century, 65 IND.
L.J. 549,557 (1990).
5. This dramatic shift in Fourth Amendment law-holding that the Amendment
protects intangible words as tangible items-occurred in two landmark 1967 cases: Berger,
388 U.S. at 51 ("[T]hat a conversation passing over a telephone wire cannot be said to
come within the Fourth Amendment's enumeration of 'persons, houses, papers, and
effects' ha[s] been negated by our subsequent cases as hereinafter noted.") and Katz, 389
U.S. at 353 ("[W]e have expressly held that the Fourth Amendment governs not only the
seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements,
overheard without any technical trespass under... local property law.") (citations
omitted). Although both cases claimed that they were merely restating settled law, no
court had held this to be true before Katz and Berger.
6. See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 ("[O]nce it is recognized that the Fourth
Amendment protects people-and not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable searches and
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For example, previous rulings had held that electronic eavesdropping
with a "slap-mike" (which touched the outer surface of an adjoining
wall but did not penetrate that wall) was permissible, while
eavesdropping on the same conversation with a "spike-mike" (which
penetrated through the adjoining wall to make contact with a sound-
conducting element on the defendant's property) was not
permissible.8 As investigative technology improved-resulting in, for
example, parabolic microphones that could eavesdrop on a
conversation from across the street-it became more and more clear
that an inquiry as to the method in which law enforcement agents
conducted the surveillance would do little to protect Fourth
Amendment rights.
Increasingly over the past thirty years, however, this last aspect
of the Katz test has been watered down or ignored. Subsequent
courts have narrowly interpreted the Katz decision as merely a
repudiation of the "trespass doctrine" of the previous forty years,
which held that government surveillance was a "search" if and only if
the law enforcement agents (or their devices) trespassed on the
property interests of the defendant.9  This overly narrow
interpretation is a result of the vague language of the test itself, which
leads courts that are struggling to define the test to view Katz through
the prism of the long history of "trespass doctrine" cases that came
before it. Applying this narrow interpretation of Katz gives too little
guidance to courts, and as they refine the test, results in a number of
decisions (and, more ominously for future cases, a line of reasoning)
that are inconsistent with the original broad intent of the Katz test.
At the same time, further advances in technologies-both those used
by criminals and those used by government investigators-have
continued to alter the landscape of the real world, making adherence
to the original intent behind the test even more critical.
As noted above, Katz actually stands for more than a mere
repudiation of the trespass doctrine; rather than merely holding that
the location of law enforcement agents (or their devices) is irrelevant,
Katz stands for the broader proposition that the method used by the
law enforcement agents is irrelevant. In adopting the language
seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the
presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.").
7. See Goldman, 316 U.S. at 134-35 (finding no Fourth Amendment violation if
"trespass did not aid materially in the use of the dictaphone" attached to a wall adjoining
defendant's office).
8. See United States v. Silverman, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961) (finding that electronic
eavesdropping that was accomplished by means of a "physical intrusion" of a spike-mike
into defendant's wall was unconstitutional).




"legitimate expectation of privacy," Katz was presenting a test that
focused solely on the activity or information that was being
monitored, without regard for how it might have been observed or
acquired by the government.
This Article argues that courts should apply the Katz test as it
was originally intended: a test which considers only the result of the
search-the type of information that was acquired; and disregards
altogether the method of the search-the action or conduct of the
agent conducting the search. Although such a test would directly
contradict a few subsequent cases that have interpreted the Katz
standard," it is entirely consistent with the paradigm shift that the
Court engineered in Katz. This argument is supported by a close
textual reading of Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz (which
set out the "reasonable expectations" test) and is also consistent with
much of the reasoning in case law from the hundred years prior to
Katz. Furthermore, application of a purely "results-based" test is all
the more necessary given the advances in technology that have
occurred since that landmark case was decided over thirty years ago.
Specifically, in the fields of computer crime (which did not exist at all
thirty years ago), sense-enhancing technology (which existed in much
cruder form), and binary or content-discriminating searches (which
are soon to become a prominent and valuable tool for law
enforcement), a continued adherence to a test that considers the
method of search used by the government will result in the same
inconsistencies that the Court observed in the electronic
eavesdropping field, in which the constitutionality of a surveillance
absurdly turned on whether the microphone "trespassed" into the
defendant's wall. Perhaps more ominously, using the method of
search as a factor in determining constitutionality will inevitably
result-indeed, has already resulted-in a gradual weakening of
Fourth Amendment protections as investigative technologies become
more sophisticated.
Part I of this Article will analyze the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test set out in the Katz case by briefly tracing the history
behind the test and then examining how the Court has applied the
test since Katz. Part II will justify a "results-based" interpretation of
the Katz test and place it in the context of the evolving case law on
the subject. Part III will examine three specific methods of
investigation: computer-assisted investigations (whether of
10. Most significantly, a reevaluation of Katz will require rejecting the rationale
(though not necessarily the rule) of Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), regarding the
protection accorded to information "given" to third parties (see infra note 144-56. and
accompanying text); and the rationale (and probably the rule) of Bond v. United States,
529 U.S. 334 (2000), on the relevance of the physical invasiveness of a search (see infra
notes 61-67 and accompanying text).
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cybercrime or more traditional crimes), sense-enhancing technology,
and binary or content-discriminating searches, and demonstrate the
ways in which improper applications of the Katz standard have
resulted in holdings that are inconsistent with Katz's original
purpose-and incompatible with technology in today's world.
I. The Katz Test: What Is a
"Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?"
A. Pre-Katz: Where the Test Came From
In the landmark case of Katz v. United States,' the Supreme
Court reversed nearly a century of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
by declaring that property interests were no longer the controlling
factor in determining whether or not a search has occurred. The
majority opinion itself, however, did little to explain what would
replace the old test;13 instead, Justice Harlan's concurrence has
become the standard to which courts now turn: whether an alleged
search violates an individual's "reasonable expectation of privacy." 4
11. 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
12. "It is true that the absence of such [physical] penetration was at one time thought
to foreclose further Fourth Amendment inquiry, for that Amendment was thought to limit
only searches and seizures of tangible property. But 'the premise that property interests
control the right of the Government to search and seize property has been discredited."'
Id. at 352-53 (citations and footnotes omitted).
13. In deciding the case, Justice Stewart's majority opinion described very specific
requirements with which the government must comply in order to legitimize electronic
surveillance: for example, obtaining a warrant from a magistrate that met the
requirements set out in two prior cases, Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966), and
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). Id at 355-56. This guidance, however, was only
helpful in what the government must be required to do once it is determined that a search
has occurred. As far as determining whether or not a search has occurred in the first
place, Justice Stewart provides little guidance, aside from noting that "[t]he government's
activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's words violated the
privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus
constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Id at
353 (emphasis added). Harlan's concurrence picked up this language and fleshed out a
more detailed test which could be applied in future cases. Some commentators have
theorized that Stewart was intentionally vague about the new test in order to ensure a
majority for a case that was radically altering Fourth Amendment law. See, eg., Lewis R.
Katz, supra note 4, at 559 ("Justice Stewart could express the Court's sense of principle in
a remarkably facile way without forcing the other members of the Court to commit to
specifics. In Katz he led the majority to reject property as the sole measure of fourth
amendment protection without committing them to a privacy test for all future cases").
14. "My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there
is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable."' Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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As is usually the case with new legal standards, even those that
represent seismic shifts in the law such as the one Katz heralded, this
new test was not constructed from scratch. The term "reasonable"
comes from the language of the Fourth Amendment itself,"5 and thus
it is unsurprising that many previous Fourth Amendment cases
turned on whether or not the defendant could reasonably believe that
his or her conduct was considered private. In 1928, the Supreme
Court considered its first wiretapping case in Olmstead v. United
States;6 and a reader of the opinion could be forgiven for believing
that the Court was in fact applying the Katz test some forty years
before it was officially set out:
The reasonable view is that one who installs in his house a
telephone instrument with connecting wires intends to project his
voice to those quite outside, and that the wires beyond his house
and messages while passing over them are not within the protection
of the Fourth Amendment. Here those who intercepted the
projected voices were not in the house of either party to the
conversation.1
7
In other words, according to the majority in Olmstead, someone
who uses a "telephone instrument" to knowingly project his or her
voice across the outside world into another's home has waived his or
her right to privacy in the content of the communication. As we shall
see, this argument is a recurring theme in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence in the realm of technology. For example, over sixty
years after Olmstead the Court was forced to consider whether a
knowing release of heat waves out of a house into the outside world
represented an implicit waiver of the right to keep the heat patterns
inside your house confidential.'
But more significant is the fact that the Olmstead Court implied a
"reasonable expectations of privacy" test-or perhaps a less formal
precursor thereof-and then found that individuals did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of their phone calls.
This is primarily because, as noted above, the Court's conception of
what is reasonably private was tied very closely to notions of property
15. The Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by an Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
16. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
17. Id. at 466.
18. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 43-44, 121 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("Heat waves, like aromas that are generated in a kitchen, or in a laboratory or opium
den, enter the public domain if and when they leave a building.")
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rights-note the determinative last sentence: "those who intercepted
the projected voices were not in the house of either party to the
conversation." Thus, in determining what degree of privacy was
"reasonable," the Olmstead Court looked first and foremost at the
location of the government observers, and since their method of
search did not involve a trespass into an area considered to be
private, the search they conducted with the wiretap was permissible.
In this way, Olmstead saw this early "reasonable expectations"
test give birth to the "property rights" test. The concept that society's
reasonable expectations are best determined by examining property
rights was not self-evident; Olmstead represented only a five-member
majority, with Justice Brandeis and even the usually strict-
constructionist Holmes writing strong dissents. 9 Furthermore, six
years later, Congress demonstrated its disagreement with Olmstead's
conclusion that people should have no "reasonable expectation" of
privacy in their telephone conversations by passing the Federal
Communications Act of 1934, which prohibited intercepting and
disclosing any information passing over telephone lines. °
Unfortunately, in subsequent cases the Supreme Court allowed
the "property rights" offspring to devour its "reasonable
expectations" parent whole. This may have been inevitable: a
"property rights" test was far easier to apply than an amorphous
"reasonableness" standard, and seemed to comport well with the
Fourth Amendment's language describing a person's "houses, papers,
and effects" as being protected from unreasonable searches.' Thus,
in its next major Fourth Amendment case involving technology, the
Court had little patience for a defendant who attempted to rely on
society's expectations of privacy. In Goldman v. United States,'
federal agents placed a dictaphone against the wall of an adjoining
office to listen to the defendant's conversations on the other side.
Even though the device could pick up conversations that were not
projected to the outside world through telephone wires, the Court
held that Olmstead's property-rights test controlled, primarily due to
administrative simplicity in applying such a bright-line rule. 3
19. Olnstead, 277 U.S. at 469485. Both Holmes and Brandeis seemed most
concerned that the government, though not trespassing when conducting the wiretap, was
in fact violating state law. Id.
20. See 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2000). Three years later, the Supreme Court applied the
exclusionary rule to this provision, thus overruling on statutory grounds the effect of
Olmstead. See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 382 (1937).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
22. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
23. In the facts of Goldman, the conversation that was overheard by the government
with the dictaphone was, in fact, a telephone conversation, but the opinion makes clear
that this fact had no bearing on the admissibility of the search. In fact, the Court rejected
August 2002]
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[Defendants argue that] the Olmstead case dealt with the tapping of
telephone wires, and the court adverted to the fact that, in using a
telephone, the speaker projects his voice beyond the confines of his
home or office and, therefore, assumes the risk that his message
may be intercepted. It is urged that where, as in the present case,
one talks in his own office, and intends his conversation to be
confined within the four walls of the room, he does not intend his
voice shall go beyond those walls and it is not to be assumed he
takes the risk of someone's use of a delicate detector in the next
room. We think, however, the distinction is too nice for practical
application of the Constitutional guarantee, and no reasonable or
logical distinction can be drawn between what federal agents did in
the present case and state officers did in the Olmstead case.24
To modem minds, this reasoning strikes us as wrong for a
number of reasons; foremost among them being that it supports a
holding which denies Fourth Amendment protection to any
conversation in our offices and potentially even our homes. The
almost casual rejection of the "reasonableness" test from Olmstead
also seems improper: if the Olmstead holding were based on a
theory-however misguided-that we have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in conversations which we "release" to the
public by sending them out on wires into the world, how could it
support eavesdropping on a private conversation in an office? But
perhaps a deeper explanation as to why this reasoning offends
modem sensibilities is its ultimate reliance on the government's
conduct-the last line compares the activities of the government
agents in Olmstead with those in Goldman and finds them
comparable, and on this basis the Court finds no "logical or
reasonable distinction" between the two cases. This focus on the
activity of the government actor rather than on the nature of the
information received seems outdated in modem times, when
information is frequently the most valuable commodity a person
possesses, and when government agents can intercept or acquire
private information with minimally intrusive technologies-thus
achieving a very intimate invasion of privacy with relatively non-
offensive activity.
the defendant's argument that his conversation was protected by the Federal
Communications Act that effectively overruled Olmstead's wiretapping holding:
[w]ords spoken in a room in the presence of another into a telephone receiver do
not constitute a communication by wire within the meaning of the [Act] .... The
listening in the next room to the words of [defendant] as he talked into the
telephone receiver was no more the interception of a wire communication, within
the meaning of the Act, than would have been the overhearing of the
conversation by one sitting in the same room.
Id. at 133-34.
24. Id. at 135.
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This triumph of formalism over realism reached its peak in
United States v. Silverman , in which the Court ruled that essentially
the identical kind of eavesdropping that was approved in Goldman
was unconstitutional if the microphone that was used did not merely
rest on the outside of an adjoining wall, but actually penetrated
through the wall a few inches to make contact with the property of
the defendant 6 As in Goldman, the only relevant factor considered
by the Court in Silverman was the method of search used by the
government: "This Court has never held that a federal officer may
without warrant and without consent physically entrench into a man's
office or home, there secretly observe or listen, and relate at the
man's subsequent criminal trial what was seen or heard."
Of course, the Court had essentially held this to be permissible
eighteen years earlier in Goldman, but their formalist test looked
only to where the government was and what it was doing rather than
the functional result of the search.
But all of this changed after Katz-or at least, it began to change.
In Katz, FBI agents attached an electronic listening device to the
outside of a public telephone booth-an action that could not
possibly offend anyone's property rights.' In the words of the
majority opinion, Katz rejected the formalist "trespass" doctrine,.9
and shifted the focus of the Fourth Amendment inquiry from
"places" to "people."'3  Given this language-and the sparseness of
other guidance in the majority opinion-some courts have held that
what Katz was rejecting was an emphasis on the location of the law
enforcement officer (or the officer's device) in determining the
constitutionality of a search.3'
But Harlan's standard-setting concurrence implies that Katz was
not really about rejecting the "place-based" analysis; in fact, Harlan
quickly pointed out that although the Fourth Amendment protects
"people, not places," the protection it affords to people generally
25. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
26. Id. at 512.
27. Id. at 511-12. In order to further emphasize that the action taken by the
government was the primary factor in determining that an unreasonable search occurred,
the Court then declared that its opinion was "based upon the reality of an actual intrusion
into a constitutionally protected area." Id. at 512.
28. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,362 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 353 ("[T]he 'trespass' doctrine [of Olmstead and Goldman] can no longer be
regarded as controlling.").
30. Id. at 351 ("[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.").
31. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978) ("Expectations of privacy
protected by the Fourth Amendment, of course, need not be based on a common-law
interest in real or personal property, or on the invasion of such an interest. These ideas
were rejected both in Jones and in Katz.") (internal citations omitted).
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"requires reference to a 'place."'32  This phrase sits somewhat
awkwardly alongside the majority opinion and makes it more difficult
to give meaning to the vague "reasonable expectations of privacy"
test.
Harlan's concurrence, if examined closely, resolves this
ambiguity. In it he attempts to focus future courts squarely-if not
solely-on the location or information sought to be protected and the
actions taken by the defendant to protect that location or
information. The few sentences in which he defines the contours of
what "reasonable expectation of privacy" means describe only the
actions taken by the person being observed or the information being
acquired, not the methods used by the government. Harlan describes
activities in a person's home as deserving protection, while "objects,
activities, or statements" that are exposed to the "'plain view' of
outsiders" are not protected.33 Harlan states that the "critical fact" in
deciding Katz was the action taken by the defendant in shutting the
phone booth door behind himself and paying for a phone call. -a
dramatic reversal from Goldman and Silverman, whose only criteria
were the actions taken by the government agents. And he concludes
his analysis by noting that the old standard of focusing on the
"physical penetration" of the defendant's premises was "bad physics
as well as bad law, for reasonable expectations of privacy may be
defeated by electronic as well as physical invasion." 35
B. Post-Katz. Does the Method of Search Matter?
In the end, both the majority opinion and Harlan's explanation
of the phrase "reasonable expectation of privacy" were sufficiently
meager that the task inevitably fell to future courts to define the
phrase more fully. Although many courts properly refused to
consider the method of surveillance used by law enforcement, others
have continued to consider the method as a factor, even though
Harlan's concurrence implies that it was this consideration-and not
a "place-based analysis,"--which was the true evil that Katz had set
out to dispel.
Very early on it became clear that the "subjective" prong of the
test-that is, whether or not defendants believed that they had an
expectation of privacy-was meaningless, for two reasons. First, the
defendants would almost never have been carrying out the illicit
activity or keeping the incriminating evidence in the first place if they
32. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 362.
1312 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53
did not believe that they were doing so in private. 6 But more
importantly, a defendant's subjective expectation of what is and is not
private can too easily be manipulated by the government itself, as
noted by Justice Marshall: "[L]aw enforcement officials, simply by
announcing their intent to monitor the content of random samples of
first-class mail or private phone conversations, could put the public
on notice of the risks they would thereafter assume in such
situations."'37 The majority in Smith v. Maryland' acknowledged this
problem in a footnote, saying there may be circumstances-such as a
refugee from a totalitarian country erroneously assuming the police
were monitoring all of his phone conversations-in which "an
individual's expectations had been 'conditioned' by influences alien to
well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms."3  The Court stated
that if such a conflict did occur between a person's subjective
expectations and well-recognized Fourth Amendment doctrine,
"those subjective expectations obviously could play no meaningful
role in ascertaining what the scope of the Fourth Amendment was."'
In other words, if the subjective prong and the objective prong of the
test conflict, the objective prong will control-which means, of
course, that the subjective prong might as well not exist. Harlan
himself seemed to recognize this a few years later, when he wrote that
in applying the test courts must "transcend the search for subjective
expectation" and instead focus on the "desirability of saddling [those
expectations] upon society.
'" 41
36. See, e.g., United States v. Nerber, 222 F.3d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 2000) ("In addition to
closing the door [and] drawing the blinds ... defendants ingested cocaine and brandished
weapons in a way they clearly would not have done had they thought outsiders might see
them."). In many cases the Court concedes that the defendant had a subjective
expectation of privacy, but merely mentions this fact in a cursory fashion before
proceeding to the objective prong of the test. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood:
It may well be that respondents did not expect that the contents of their garbage
bags would become known to the police or other members of the public. An
expectation of privacy does not give rise to Fourth Amendment protection,
however, unless society is prepared to accept that expectation as objectively
reasonable.
486 U.S. 35, 39-40 (1988). A notable exception is the case of Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735, 743 (1979) ("Although subjective expectations cannot be scientifically gauged, it is
too much to believe that telephone subscribers, under these circumstances, harbor any
general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret.")
37. Smith, 442 U.S. at 750 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
38. 442 U.S. 735.
39. Id at 740 n.5.
40. Id.
41. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Wayne
R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment: "Second to None in the Bill of Rights," 75 ILL. B.J.
424, 427 (1987); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REv. 349,403 (1973) ("An actual subjective expectation of privacy obviously has
not place in a statement of what Katz held or in a theory of what the Fourth Amendment
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Thus, in applying the Katz test a court's sole purpose is to
determine what expectations of privacy society deems to be
reasonable. In interpreting this language from Katz, the Supreme
Court has informed us that merely relying on existing Fourth
Amendment cases would result in a useless tautology: "[1]egitimation
of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the
Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or
personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and
permitted by society."" This continued emphasis on property law
again demonstrates that, notwithstanding the famous "people, not
places" language in the majority opinion, many courts properly reject
the idea that Katz supplanted a "place-based" analysis, since the
location of the search and the defendant's relationship to that
location are still a significant factor in determining whether or not the
search was valid.43 These courts focus on the nature of the place,
object, or activity being searched, essentially ignoring the method of
search used by the government.
Indeed, numerous Supreme Court cases follow a purely "results-
based" Katz test. In Oliver v. United States,' the Court identified
three factors as part of the Katz test: "the intention of the Framers of
the Fourth Amendment, the uses to which the individual has put a
location, and our societal understanding that certain areas deserve the
most scrupulous protection from government invasion."4 The Court
then applied these standards and concluded that society had no
"reasonable expectation of privacy" in marijuana that was growing on
an open field on a defendant's property. Although the dissent
objected to the rather egregious actions by the government agents in
Oliver-walking around a locked gate with a "No Trespassing" sign
attached to it, an action which would clearly expose a private party to
criminal liability46-- the majority decided that the government activity
itself was irrelevant.' Instead, the Court held that "[tihere is no
societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities, such as
the cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields." The Court further
noted that the fields could easily be seen by airplanes flying overhead,
protects."); Lewis R. Katz, supra note 4, at 560 ("The subjective prong of the Harlan test,
though given equal prominence in the original opinion, turned out to be useless.").
42. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978).
43. See id. ("[B]y focusing on legitimate expectations of privacy in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, the Court has not altogether abandoned the use of property concepts in
determining the presence or absence of the privacy interests protected by that
Amendment.").
44. 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984).
45. Id. at 178 (citations omitted).
46. Id. at 194-95 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 173.
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implying that the fact that the government chose a different method
of investigation in this case was immaterial."
In California v. Greenwood,4 9 the Court applied the language
from Oliver to conclude that "society as a whole possesses no such
understanding [of privacy] with regard to garbage left for collection at
the side of the street."' As in Oliver, the dissent focused-at least in
part-on the action by the government agent: "Every week for two
months, and at least once more a month later, the Laguna Beach
police clawed through [defendant's] trash ... ."" The dissent later
argued that "[m]ost of us... would be incensed to discover a
meddler-whether a neighbor, a reporter, or a detective-scrutinizing
our sealed trash containers to discover some detail of our personal
lives.,12 But the majority instead focused on the items being searched
as well as the actions taken by the defendants: "[D]eposit[ing] their
garbage in an area particularly suited for public inspection and, in a
manner of speaking,... for the express purpose of having strangers
take it, respondents could have no reasonable expectation of privacy
in the inculpatory items that they discarded."53
Unfortunately, the case law is far from consistent in applying a
test that considers only the result of the surveillance. Throughout
various applications of the Katz test, the method of surveillance
continues to survive as a factor in determining whether or not a
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy. A recent
American Bar Association task force isolated seven factors that
courts apply in determining whether or not a physical surveillance is a
search, and four of the seven related directly to the method used by
the government: the degree of physical intrusion of the search, the
availability of the technology used to the public, the extent to which
the technology used enhances the natural senses, and the extent to
which surveillance is unnecessarily intrusive.'
Specific examples from the case law include the "flyover" cases,
in which the Court has held that observing or taking pictures of
48. Id
49. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
50. IL at 43-44.
51. Id at 45 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
52- I& at 51 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 40-41 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
54. See Christopher Slobogin, Technology-Assisted Physical Surveillance: The
American Bar Association's Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 383, 390-
398 (1997). The other three factors, which are consistent with the language and spirit of
the Katz test, were the nature of the place observed, the steps taken by the defendant to
enhance privacy, and the nature of the object or activity observed. Id. The task force
criticizes five of these seven standards, concluding that only the nature of the place
observed and the amount of unnecessary intrusion are "central to any analysis of physical
surveillance technology." Id at 398.
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activities or items from an airplane does not constitute a "search"-
regardless of the area being observed-since there is no "physical
entry" onto the defendant's property.5 For example, in California v.
Ciraolo6 the Court held that observations from an airplane are not a
"search" since they are made in a "physically nonintrusive" manner.
Later, in Florida v. Riley, 7 a plurality held that government agents
observing the defendant's property from a helicopter 400 feet above
the ground was not a search, noting that "[w]e would have a different
case if flying at that altitude had been contrary to law or regulation,""
and declared that it was "of obvious importance that the helicopter in
this case was not violating the law." 59
Until quite recently, a methods-based test was also applied to
searches involving so-called "sense-enhancing" technologies, such as
heat detectors or telescopic lenses on cameras, although the Kyllo
case, discussed below, now calls that into question.
55. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227,237 (1986).
56. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
57. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
58. Id at 451.
59. Id. Justice O'Connor's concurrence refers back to Katz and appropriately argues
that the correct inquiry centered on the amount of privacy society was prepared to give to
the location in question, not the method used to observe the location:
In determining whether [defendant] had a reasonable expectation of privacy
from aerial observation, the relevant inquiry... is not whether the helicopter was
where it had a right to be under FAA regulations. Rather, consistent with Katz,
we must ask whether the helicopter was in the public airways at an altitude at
which members of the public travel with sufficient regularity that [defendant's]
expectation of privacy was not "one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable"'.
l at 454 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting from Katz) (citation omitted). The dissent
agrees with O'Connor on this point, claiming that the plurality "reads almost as if Katz
had never been decided." Id. at 456 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). The
dissent disagrees with O'Connor only on the "empirical matter" of whether the public
actually did fly over defendant's property at such a low altitude often enough to render
defendant's expectation of privacy unreasonable. Ia at 464-65. The distinction between
developing a new technology that allows the government to search intimate areas in a less
physically invasive manner (such as a thermal imager or a parabolic microphone) and a
technology becoming widely accepted in society so as to alter what is a reasonable
expectation of privacy (such as observations with flashlights or from high-flying aircraft) is
a subtle but immensely significant one; see infra notes, 129-42 and accompanying text.
60. As explained by the American Bar Association report, supra note 54, some courts
have tried to distinguish between "devices that 'improve' the human senses [like
binoculars, flashlights, and telephoto lenses] and devices that 'replace' them [such as heat-
sensing technology or x-ray machines]." Courts as a rule will be more likely to accept a
search made with a "sense-improving" technology than a "sense-replacing" technology.
Compare United States v. Whaley, 779 F.2d 585 (11th Cir. 1986) (use of binoculars not a
search) and Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (use of flashlight not a search) with
United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359 (2d. Cir. 1985) (trained dog is a search) and
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (electronic tracer would be a search if it
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Two recent Supreme Court decisions highlight the growing
tension in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on this question. In
Bond v. United States,6' the Court focused on the method of search
employed by the government to conclude that a government agent
squeezing a piece of luggage in an overhead compartment constituted
a "search" under the Fourth Amendment. More recently, in Kyllo v.
United States,62 the Court held that the use of a thermal imager to
detect patterns of heat emanating from a home also constituted a
"search" even though the method of search was non-invasive.
In Bond, the defendant was travelling on a bus which passed
through a border patrol checkpoint, and a federal customs agent
boarded the bus to check the immigration status of its passengers.
After ensuring that the passengers were all legally in the country, the
agent walked up to the front of the bus from the back, squeezing the
soft luggage that the passengers had stored in the overhead rack.
When the agent squeezed defendant's bag, he felt a hard, "brick-like"
object; he then asked and received defendant's permission to open
the bag and found a large brick of methamphetamine.6  The
government argued that the defendant had exposed the contents of
his bag to the public-or at least the way those contents felt-since he
used a soft-sided bag and left it in an area where it would routinely
(and foreseeably) be manipulated by other passengers.' The
Supreme Court disagreed, and distinguished the case from the
"flyover" cases in which the defendants were found to have exposed
the contents of their field to the public, solely on the basis of the
method of search used by the government official: "[p]hysically
invasive ins6 pection is simply more intrusive than purely visual
inspection." The dissent pointed out that this rationale would lead
to "a constitutional jurisprudence of 'squeezes,' '. noting that the
distinction between everyday handling and jostling of a piece of
luggage and an "exploratory" manipulation of the bag was overly
fine.
67
conveys information beyond what could be observed with the naked eye). As I argue
below, the distinction between sense-improving and sense-replacing is a false dichotomy,
and engaging in such a scientifically meaningless categorization is precisely the kind of
fruitless exercise that is the natural result of focusing on the method of search. See infra
notes 177-88, and accompanying text.
61. 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
62. 533 U.S. 227 (2001).
63. Bond, 529 U.S. at 335-36.
64. Id at 337.
65. Id
66. Id. at 342 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
67. As the dissent notes, everyday manipulation of baggage and "exploratory"
manipulation of baggage differ quite clearly based on the intent of the individual doing the
manipulating, but the Court had recently decided that the state of mind or intention of the
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The Bond case also provides a good example of the semantic
cheats that courts sometimes engage in when interpreting the Katz
test; in this case using the word "intrusive" to mean (rather like
Humpty Dumpty) what they want it to mean at different times. In
fact the word has two quite different meanings in the context of the
Fourth Amendment: (a) physical invasiveness or (b) degree of prying
into private affairs. Under a results-based test, the second definition
is a critical aspect of whether a surveillance is a search, while the first
should be irrelevant.6' In the original Katz concurrence, there is no
ambiguity: Justice Harlan was careful to specify that "physical
intrusiveness" should no longer be the controlling factor in
determining whether or not a search had occurred.69 Unfortunately
subsequent courts have not been as careful to distinguish between
physical intrusiveness and privacy intrusiveness.
United States v. Nerbei° provides a good example of this
confusion. In considering the validity of covert video surveillance of
the defendants in a hotel room after government informants left the
room, the Ninth Circuit considered the "severity of the intrusion" to
be critical.71 The court cited Katz for this proposition (which, being a
case of electronic bugging, had no issue of physical invasiveness and
thus obviously meant "intrusive" in the sense of invading privacy).
The court then went on to cite Bond' and United States v. Place,73 two
cases in which the Court used "intrusive" in the sense of "physically
invasive." Nerber then cited two video surveillance cases from other
circuits, one of which compares video surveillance to the airplane
surveillance in Ciraolo, which it described as "minimally-intrusive"
and declared "[h]ere, unlike in Ciraolo, the government's intrusion is
not minimal. It is not a one-time overhead flight or a glance over the
government agent had no relevance in determining whether or not a search occurred. ld.
at 342 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)).
68. As noted infra notes 101-05, physical invasiveness can become relevant under the
prohibition against seizures-that is, if a test is so invasive that it requires a suspect to stop
and wait, or blood to be taken, etc.-then it may be an unconstitutional seizure. But that
has nothing to do with whether or not a "search" has occurred.
69. United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) ("[O]nce it is recognized that the
Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable
searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon
the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.") (emphasis
added).
70. 222 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2000).
71. Id. at 601 ("[T]he legitimacy of a citizen's expectation of privacy in a particular
place may be affected by the nature of the intrusion that occurs.").
72. Specifically the Nerber court quoted the portion of Bond which held that
"[p]hysically invasive inspection is simply more intrusive than purely visual inspection."
Id. at 602 (citing Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334,337 (2000).
73. 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (in which the Supreme Court held that a dog sniffing luggage is
not a "search" because it is "much less intrusive than a typical search").
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fence by a passer-by"74 -again switching gears by citing cases which
used the term "intrusive" in the privacy-invasive sense. The Nerber
court concluded that "[t]he sweeping, indiscriminate manner in which
video surveillance can intrude upon us, regardless of where we are,
dictates that its use be approved only in limited circumstances."'75
How the physical invasiveness factors that were considered in Bond
and Place contributed to this conclusion-aside from the fact that
they more or less by coincidence used the same term as the highly
relevant video surveillance and flyover precedents-remains a
mystery.
Of course, there is more at work than mere semantic sloppiness,
especially given the Court's recent unambiguous re-affirmance of the
"physical invasiveness" factor in Bond.76 But overall, the tendency of
courts to use the term "intrusive" to apply to both physical
invasiveness and degree of prying into private affairs helps to explain
why the former has survived so tenaciously as a factor in the Katz
test.
If Bond represents the most recent incarnation of the "methods-
based" test, Kyllo v. United States, decided one year later, is perhaps
the strongest affirmation so far of the "results-based" test. In Kyllo,
government agents suspected the defendant was using high-intensity
heat lamps to grow marijuana in his home. In order to confirm their
suspicion, they conducted a warrantless scan of the house using a
thermal imager, a device which detects infrared radiation. The heat
patterns detected by the imager provided further evidence that the
defendant was using heat lamps, and the agents then acquired a
warrant, searched the home, and found marijuana.'
On the first round of appeals, the Ninth Circuit remanded the
case for the District Court to determine the "intrusiveness of the
thermal imaging device. '7 8 As noted above,79 "intrusive" can mean
either physical invasiveness or revealing of intimate information. The
Ninth Circuit made it clear that they meant "intrusive" in the latter
sense, since they were asking for a hearing to determine the "qualit
and the degree of detail of information that [the device] can glean."
Thus, the trial court was instructed to focus on the results of the
surveillance, to determine "whether, on the one extreme, this device
74. United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir, 1987) (quoted by
Nerber, 222 F.3d at 602).
75. Nerber, 222 F.3d at 603 (emphasis added).
76. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
77. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-30, (2001).
78. ItL See also United States v. Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526, 530 (9th Cir. 1994) ("We must
have some factual basis for gauging the intrusiveness of the thermal imaging device...
79. See infra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
80. Kyllo, 37 F.3d at 530.
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can detect sexual activity in the bedroom, as Kyllo's expert suggests,
or, at the other extreme, whether it can only detect hot spots where
heat is escaping from a structure."81
The trial court responded by measuring the device's
"intrusiveness" in both senses of the word: it reported that on the
one hand, it "emits no rays or beams" and "cannot penetrate walls or
windows;" and on the other, it "did not show any people or activity
within the walls of the structure" and "no intimate details of the home
were observed." Unsurprisingly, the Ninth Circuit ignored the
findings on physical invasiveness of the device (the method of the
surveillance) and decided the case based only on the result of the
search: the imager "did not expose any intimate details of Kylo's
life," but only "amorphous 'hot spots' on the roof and exterior wall,"
and the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in such
information.'
The Supreme Court reversed, but maintained (for the most part)
the Ninth Circuit's focus on the type of information acquired. The
Court first focused on the place being observed-the interior of the
home-and noted that "there is a ready criterion, with roots deep in
the common law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists,
and that is acknowledged to be reasonable."" The Court then set out
a results-based test for sense-enhancing technologies: if the use of the
technology obtains information "that could not otherwise have been
obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area," a search has occurred."' Unfortunately, the Court also included
a poorly phrased methods-based caveat to the test, adding "at least
where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public
use."
81. Id. at 530-31. The Ninth Circuit was thus not concerned with how the thermal
imager functioned, but simply what information it revealed; it needed details on "the
device's ability to detect the shapes of heat-emitting objects inside a home." Id
82. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30.
83. United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1047 (1999). The Court also noted,
somewhat dubiously, that the defendant had not even shown a subjective expectation of
privacy (thus reviving the nearly-defunct first prong of the Katz test), since he made no
attempt to conceal the heat escaping from his home. Id at 1046. Thus, the Ninth Circuit's
analysis of the subjective prong, like its analysis of the objective prong, was independent of
the method of search used, focusing instead on the actions taken by the defendant to keep
the information private.
84. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (emphasis in the original).
85. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
86. Id The dissent made the most headway in criticizing the majority's "not in general
public use" caveat-noting that "the threat to privacy will grow, rather than recede, as the
use of intrusive equipment becomes more readily available." Id at 47 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). The dissent also questions how a court is supposed to determine whether or
not a certain technology is in "general public use," noting that around 10,000 thermal
imagers have been produced and that they are "readily available to the public." Id at n.5
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The four justices who dissented in Kyllo focused almost
exclusively on the method of the search, declaring that there is "a
distinction of constitutional magnitude between 'through-the wall
surveillance"' and "off-the wall" surveillance.' The majority refuted
this distinction by pointing out that "a powerful directional
microphone picks up only sound emanating from a house-and a
satellite capable of scanning from many miles away would pick up
only visible light emanating from a house," and stated that the Court
had "rejected such a mechanical interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment in Katz, where the eavesdropping device picked up only
sound waves that reached the exterior of the phone booth."8
Thus, Kyllo interpreted the Katz test somewhat differently than
the Bond opinion did just one term earlier, laying bare a growing
dissonance in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and forcing courts
to struggle with an increasingly significant question: to what extent
should the method of investigation or surveillance used by the
government-and specifically, its degree of invasiveness-be
considered in evaluating whether a "search" has occurred?
H. Reviving Katz by Disregarding the Method of Search
A. Why the Method Should Not Matter
As noted above, this Article proposes a simple answer to this
question: the method of surveillance should be irrelevant, and the
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Although the caveat may have been poorly worded, it is in fact a
necessary element of the Katz test, since without it the Fourth Amendment would not be
flexible enough to keep pace with legitimate changes in societal expectations of privacy
brought on by technological changes. See infra Part ll.C.
87. Id. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent was also concerned with the type of
information that was acquired, but it referred to the method of search in order to
determine the confidentiality that the specific kind of information deserved. According to
the dissent, "through-the-wall" technology "gives the observer or listener direct access to
information in a private area," while "off-the wall" technology only reveals "inferences in
the public domain." Id. Later, the dissent argues that the thermal imager "did not
penetrate the walls of the petitioner's home" and though it picked up "details of the home
that were exposed to the public, it did not obtain any information regarding the interior of
the home" Id. at 44 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Of course, the imager did reveal information regarding the interior of the home-namely,
that there were unusual amounts of heat being generated in certain areas-and the details
that were revealed were only "exposed to the public" because the dissent effectively
defined "exposed to the public" as any information that is detectable by "off-the-wall"
technologies. Thus again we see the dissent using the method of the search to determine
whether or not the information acquired was deserving of protection. See also id. at 42
("[T]his case involves nothing more than off-the-wall surveillance by law enforcement
officers to gather information exposed to the general public from the outside of
petitioner's home.").
88. 1& at 35.
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results of the surveillance are all that should matter in determining
whether an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy has been
infringed. Thus, in applying the Katz test, courts should look only to
the characteristics of the item or information being observed-its
location, its nature, and/or the actions taken by the defendant to
conceal it.
The inconsistencies created by considering the method of search
only multiply as technologies become more sophisticated and courts
struggle to find the correct analogy for any given surveillance method
employed by the government. In some cases, courts are forced to
choose between equally plausible analogies in order to determine
how the Fourth Amendment applies: is thermal imaging analogous to
watching snow melt off a roof or is it more like using binoculars?0
Or perhaps it is most analogous to using a dog to detect the odor of
illegal contraband?9' Is reading the content of an e-mail is analogous
to wiretapping a phone,' or is it analogous to accessing a stored
voicemail? Or perhaps reading the content of an e-mail is
comparable to reading the content of regular mail?93 And frequently
courts must stack analogy on top of analogy: if reading the content of
an e-mail is analogous to wiretapping a phone, we need another
analogy to determine whether the founders would think wiretapping
violates the Fourth Amendment-is wiretapping a phone the
equivalent of standing outside a window and listening to a private
conversation, or is it more like standing inside the room listening to
the conversation?94 These inquiries become less and less relevant
89. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 43 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90. See Commonwealth v. Gindlesperger, 743 A.2d 898, 907 (Pa. 1999) (Castille, J.
dissenting) (arguing that thermal imaging is analogous to the use of binoculars because it
merely "enhances that which can lawfully be observed.")
91. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gindlesperger, 706 A.2d 1216, 1220 (Pa. Super. 1997)
(noting that the lower court analogized the thermal imager to police contraband and that
the "dog sniff theory in relation to thermal imagers ha[s] been accepted by some courts
and rejected by others.").
92. See U.S. v. Maxwell, 45 MJ. 406, 417 (1996) ("[T]he technology used to
communicate via e-mail is extraordinarily analogous to a telephone conversation. Indeed,
e-mail is transmitted from one computer to another via telephone communication, either
hard line or satellite.").
93. See, e.g., id at 417-18.
E-mail transmissions are not unlike other forms of modern communication. We
can draw parallels from these other mediums. For example, if a sender of first-
class mail seals an envelope and addresses it to another person, the sender can
reasonably expect the contents to remain private and free from the eyes of the
police absent a search warrant founded upon probable cause.
Id. at 417-18 (citations omitted). See also United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp.
1177, 1184 (S.D. Ohio 1997) ("E-mail is almost equivalent to sending a letter via the
mails").
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(and more and more metaphysical) as we move further into the realm
of cyber-investigations and the use of devices that detect information
that is invisible to the human ear or eye. The only relevant
consideration is the result of the surveillance: what information does
the government acquire as a result of making the observations?
This proposal might at first seem counter-intuitive, since the very
thing that we are describing-a "search"-naturally leads one to
think about the verb itself, i.e., the action or conduct of the
government official. But in using the Fourth Amendment to strike a
balance between individual privacy and a government's legitimate
need to investigate a crime, we are not trying to prevent or restrict
certain kinds of government conduct per se, but rather to keep certain
items, locations, and/or pieces of information beyond the reach of
government officials," regardless of the manner in which they are
able to observe them.96
It may also seem natural to consider the nature of the
government's conduct because certain actions by the government
seem so much more invasive and egregious than others: a full body
frisk, for example, seems to be more objectionable than walking
through a metal detector.9' Intuition would suggest that a meaningful
94. Sometimes courts are even forced to analogize in the other direction-for
example, a recent district court judge proposed applying wiretapping standards to the
interception of standard mail, since the two methods of surveillance have "certain
similarities." "The search of [defendant's] mail represents, like a wiretap, the continuous
interception of a stream of communication. The interception of numerous pieces of mail,
like the interception of numerous communications on a wiretap, represents a series of
seizures supported by a single showing of probable cause." United States v. Heatley, 1998
WL 691201, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
Even less sophisticated technologies require courts that focus on the method to use
strained analogies: a canine sniff, for example, has been held to be "far more analogous to
an electronic 'bug' than to a flashlight," since a flashlight merely "augments" or enhances
perception, while a canine sniff and an electronic bug "replaces" natural human
perception. See Jones v. Latexo Indep. Sch. Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223, 233 (E.D. Tex. 1980);
see also State v. Riley, 88 Ohio App. 3d 468, 474 (1993). This false dichotomy between
"sense-enhancing" and "sense-replacing" searches will be discussed infra notes 177-88 and
accompanying text.
95. That is, beyond their reach unless a neutral magistrate has issued a warrant
allowing the government to seek such information, or unless one of the exceptions to the
warrant requirement applies.
96. See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) ("The basic purpose of
[the Fourth] Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by
governmental officials.").
97. Compare Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,17 (1968) ("[A body frisk] is a serious intrusion
upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong
resentment, and is not to be undertaken lightly.") with United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d
799, 806 (2nd Cir. 1974) (arguing that magnetometer in airport involves "minimal invasion
of privacy" because it involves none of the "indignities involved in fingerprinting, paring
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test would have to distinguish between an invasive method, with all
the inconvenience, discomfort, and even embarrassment it might
cause, and a non-invasive method, in which an individual might not
even know that he or she is being searched.
There are three responses to this intuitive argument. First, we
need to distinguish between surveillances that infringe on property
rights and those that infringe on bodily integrity. The first category-
a surveillance that infringes on a person's property right-was
unequivocally rejected in Katz. Even the courts that have interpreted
Katz narrowly agree that the case repudiated the prior "trespass
doctrine" which looked to invasion of property rights, thus instructing
courts to disregard any invasion of property rights that might occur
during the course of the surveillance. As noted above, this was a
long-overdue acknowledgment that certain kinds of quite
objectionable surveillance, such as listening to everything that is being
said in a private home or on a private telephone line, could now be
accomplished without infringing on anyone's property right.
Unfortunately, even this aspect of Katz is occasionally lost in the
subseqguent Supreme Court case law, as we saw in the flyover cases
above. 8 A close reconsideration of these arguments once again
affirms the superfluous nature of the "property rights intrusion"
factor: when the government observes our backyard, do we really
care if they are doing it undetectably and legally from a satellite miles
in the air or blatantly and illegally from a helicopter hovering ten feet
above us? The fundamental-indeed, the only-concern is with the
information that the government acquires and the location they are
monitoring, not the action they took to acquire the information.
The second response to the intuitive objection deals with
infringements on bodily integrity; a narrow reading of Katz would not
require courts to disregard this factor. And it is true that government
actions which infringe on our bodily integrity are more troublesome
than those which infringe on property rights; certainly a regime in
which the government had the right to physically infringe on our
person as long as they only sought publicly available information is
of a person's fingernails, or a frisk") (citations omitted). Even though a frisk involves
greater physical intrusion by the government agent, circuit courts have unanimously
looked to the result and not the method and held that the use of a magnetometer is no less
a "search" than a full body frisk. See, e.g., Albarado, 495 F.2d. at 803 ("Even the
unintrusive magnetometer walk-through is a search in that it searches for and discloses
metal items within areas most intimate to the person where there is a normal expectation
of privacy"); United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770 (4th Cir. 1972) ("[A]
government officer, without permission, discerned metal on Epperson's person. That he
did so electronically rather than by patting down his outer clothing or 'frisking' may make
the search more tolerable and less offensive-but it is still a search.").
98. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
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objectionable. For example, society would not likely accept law
enforcement officers routinely and without cause forcing individuals
on the street to stand against a wall while comparing their faces to
hundreds of photographs of known suspects. On the other hand, it
would probably be reasonable for a government agent to merely take
a picture of the individual (while s/he was in a public place) and then
compare that picture with other pictures." There is no real difference
in the information that is acquired, merely in the method in which it is
done; yet one is highly objectionable, and the other much less so.
The Supreme Court answered this objection, albeit indirectly, in
Terry v. OhioY0° in which it ruled that a body frisk was a "search,"
although one which could be constitutional under certain
circumstances.10 The Court was careful to note that not only were the
defendants "searched" in this case-i.e., the police officer took
actions in order to acquire information about what they may have had
been carrying-but they were also "seized"-i.e., the officer used
force to prevent their physical bodies from moving freely.1" In Terry,
99. A modem version of this technique is becoming more and more common: using
facial recognition technology to compare hundreds of faces in a crowd to pictures of
known criminals. See Christopher S. Milligan, Note, Facial Recognition Technology, Video
Surveillance, and Privacy, 9 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 295,297 (1999). Originally developed
by the military for national security purposes, facial recognition technology has found its
way into many aspects of law enforcement, from the Central Intelligence Agency and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (who use it to identify individuals entering the
country) to the West Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles (who use it as part of their
fraud prevention program). Id- at 297-98. Like other biometric technologies, face
recognition works by scanning the face, converting it into digital code that will function as
the basis of comparison, and then storing that data for future reference. See Robyn Moo-
Young, Note, "Eyeing" the Future: Surviving the Criticisms of Biometric Authentication, 5
N.C. BANKING INST. 421, 424, 426-29, 438 (2001). Because the codes are usually based
either on the spatial relationships between features (i.e., the distance between the nose
and the lips) or the subject's bone structure, the system can take into account changes in
appearance (such as those that occur due to aging or weight gain). Id. at 437-38; Milligan,
supra, at 304-306.
The spreading use of this new technology has raised concerns about excessive use of
government power, but under the analysis proposed in this article, facial recognition
technology is no different from an officer comparing a photograph of a known criminal to
the faces of people the officer passes in the street. Both methods involve comparing a face
while in a public place with pictures of known criminals; one method is merely more
efficient than the other. Since the content of information received by the officer is
identical in the two cases, the Fourth Amendment analysis under Katz should also be
identical.
100. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
101. Id. at 30-31. Namely, if the officer reasonably believes there is criminal activity
afoot and the person with whom the officer is dealing may be armed and dangerous, and
the frisk is necessary to protect the officer's safety during the investigation. Id.
102. See id. at 20. ("In this case there can be no question, then, that Officer McFadden
'seized' petitioner and subjected him to a 'search' when he took hold of him and patted
down the outer surface of his clothing.").
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there was both a search and a seizure (though both were ultimately
deemed legal). If a police officer instead walked behind the
defendant and scanned him unobtrusively with an X-ray device that
could see through clothing, the defendant would have been searched
but not seized. Conversely, if the police officer had merely detained
the defendant for fifteen minutes until a witness could appear to
identify him, he would have been seized but not searched. In other
words, the separate constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
seizures can, should, and does apply to inappropriate or abusive
government tactics which unjustifiably infringe on the bodily integrity
of the individual."° So, for example, the kind of food that a person
ate for breakfast in a public restaurant may be a fact in which the
person has no reasonable expectation of privacy-but a government
agent must acquire the information in a way that does not constitute
an unreasonable seizure. The investigating agent could observe the
person while eating or interrogate others that observed the meal, but
not force the person to contribute saliva samples for testing nor force
the person to accompany the officer to the hospital for an X-ray of
the suspect's stomach'04
Thus, the intuitive objection that physically invasive methods of
surveillance somehow seem more objectionable than non-invasive
ones is countered, at least in part, by noting that consideration of
property-rights invasions were firmly rejected in Katz and more
significant concerns about infringing on bodily integrity would be
covered under the prohibition against unconstitutional seizures. But
the third and perhaps the most important response to the intuition
that the invasiveness of the search should matter is that it is this very
intuitive feeling which will lead to an inexorable narrowing of the
103. An example of the dual analysis can be found in United States v. Place, 462 U.S.
696 (1983), in which federal agents seized the defendant's suitcase at the airport and kept
it for ninety minutes while it was transferred to a location where a trained dog could sniff
it to determine if cocaine were present. The Court first determined whether the ninety
minute "seizure" of the luggage was appropriate-which involved a balance between "the
nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests
against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion"-
which relies heavily on the actions of the government agents in conducting the seizure. Id.
at 703. The Court then conducted a separate inquiry into whether the canine sniff itself
was an unreasonable search, and applied a test that was heavily results-based. ld at 706-
70. See also infra note 194 and accompanying text.
104. The year after Terry, the Supreme Court decided the somewhat analogous case of
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969). In investigating a rape case in which the victim
said her assailant was African-American, police officers rounded up at least twenty-four
African Americans without cause and fingerprinted them all at police headquarters. The
Court held that these actions violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, and, as
in Terry, appeared to hold that the officers in question had conducted both an
unreasonable "search" (in taking the fingerprints) and "seizure" (in detaining the
defendant for the fingerprinting and a subsequent interrogation). See id. at 727-28.
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scope of Fourth Amendment protection as technology progresses and
increasingly intimate information can be acquired or intercepted
without any physical invasion at all. Perhaps more ominously, a focus
on physical invasiveness will reinforce the popular conception that
certain government investigations/observations are not a search as
long as they don't feel like a search, leading to a world where
ubiquitous video cameras, police use of sensors that can see through
walls and clothes, and even monitoring of electronic mail, will become
accepted by both the courts and the public, even as our true scope of
privacy becomes narrower and narrower. And as one commentator
has noted, non-intrusive sense-enhanced searches are by definition
undetectable, and so may chill free speech (since average citizens
cannot know whether they are under surveillance at any given time)
and decrease police accountability (since the community as a whole
may never learn of unjustified or mistaken police searches).,"5
In order to see how improving technology will erode Fourth
Amendment protection if search methods are taken into account, we
need only re-examine the cases in which judges object to certain types
of surveillance based on the method used by the government. In
every case, we can envision-quite easily-a technological
advancement that would satisfy the concerns regarding invasiveness,
thus allowing the government to conduct a nearly identical
investigation which reveals identical information as the search that
was supposedly invalid. For example, in Oliver v. United States, the
dissent objected to the conduct of the police in ignoring "No
Trespassing" signs and walking across defendant's land without
permission to find marijuana plants growing in an open field,1 and
argued that the search should be unconstitutional in part because the
police violated trespassing laws when they entered the land." Yet
only three years later, in California v. Ciraolo,'° the Court upheld a
search in which government agents flew a plane over the defendant's
property and observed illegal drugs from the air-clearly not
violating any trespassing laws and thus robbing the Oliver dissent of
much of its strength. In Ciraolo, it was the majority that improperly
considered the "non-intrusive" nature of the search, noting that the
officers were "within public navigable airspace [i.e., not trespassing]"
and observing "in a physically non-intrusive manner."1' Meanwhile,
the dissent (consisting of two of the three dissenting Justices in
Oliver) now sought to return to Katz's true purpose:
105. See David E. Steinberg, Making Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches, 74 MINN. L.
REV. 563,568-74 (1990).
106. 466 U.S. 170, 184-85 (1984) (Marshall, J. dissenting).
107. Id. at 195-96. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
108. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
109. Id. at 213.
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Reliance on the manner of surveillance is directly contrary to the
standard of Katz, which identifies a constitutionally protected
privacy right by focusing on the interests of the individual and of a
free society. Since Katz, we have consistently held that the
presence or absence of physical trespass by police is constitutionally
irrelevant to the question whether society is prepared to recognize
an asserted privacy interest as reasonable."0
The same concern applies to Bond v. United States,"' the recent
case in which the Court invalidated a search because the customs
agent felt the defendant's bag in "an exploratory manner."". It is not
difficult to imagine a customs agent in the near future equipped with
a device that can see through the sides of an opaque bag. Under the
majority's analysis, this would presumably allow a customs agent to
examine the contents of everyone's bag on the bus, as long as he did
not squeeze any of the bags. Surely the Court did not mean for the
Fourth Amendment protection in such cases to be so fragile.
The problem of improving technology was also a key issue in the
Katz decision itself. For over fifty years before Katz, technological
advances had made focusing on the method of the search (where the
agents stood in electronic eavesdropping cases) less and less relevant
to the real questions: what information was being intercepted and
what areas were under observation? In the post-Katz era the same
misdirection is occurring. Courts still return to the method of search
even when changing technology causes this analysis to lead to absurd
and inconsistent results-for example, allowing a police officer to use
binoculars to observe a living room from a neighboring property or a
public alley,"' but not allowing a police officer to use a high-powered
telescope to observe the inside of an apartment from an apartment
across the street.' In each case the police are using technology to
110. Id. at 223 (Powell, J. dissenting). As noted in the text, this dissent was joined by
Justices Marshall and Brennan, who three years earlier had respectively written and joined
the dissent in Oliver which declared that "when the owner of undeveloped land has taken
precautions to exclude the public" such that "a deliberate entry by a private citizen ... will
expose him to liability," that government officials should also "be obliged to respect such
unequivocal and universally understood manifestations of a landowner's desire for
property." Oliver, 466 U.S. at 194-95. To be sure, the Oliver dissent also includes a
number of arguments consistent with Katz, including an analysis of the owner's traditional
legal right to exclude others from his or her property, and consideration of the sometimes
intimate purposes for which privately owned land is used. Id. at 191-92. However, the
focus on the physical trespass undertaken by the officers, as well as the proposal of a rule
which differentiates the protection given to private land based on the posting of "No
Trespassing" signs (which would be impossible to perceive from the air), indicate that the
Oliver dissent still considered the method of search to be a significant factor. Id. at 235.
111. 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
112. I& at 338-39.
113. See State v. Kender, 588 P.2d 447 (Haw. 1978).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1980) (observation from
apartment across the street using telescope is a search); State v. Thompson, 241 N.W.2d
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peer into a very private (and constitutionally protected) area. How
they position themselves and what kind of technology they use is
irrelevant to whether a legitimate expectation of privacy has been
infringed upon-just as the "trespass" that was or was not committed
by the microphone should have been irrelevant in Silverman and
Goldman.
B. Historic Support for a Purely Results-Based Katz Test
As noted above, the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test had
numerous precursors in the language of Fourth Amendment opinions
prior to Katz. Similarly, the concept of a results-based test is also
supported by language in many pre-Katz decisions. In fact, the
concept of focusing solely on the result of the surveillance and not the
method formed the basis of one of the earliest and most significant
Fourth Amendment cases. One hundred and fifteen years ago in
Boyd v. United States,115 the Supreme Court considered the validity of
a federal law which allowed the United States to subpoena a
defendant's private papers in order to use the information recorded
on the papers against the defendant in a revenue case. Under the
law, if the defendant refused to produce the papers, the allegations
against the defendant regarding the content of the papers were
deemed to be admitted by the defendant.1 6 The Court held that this
constituted an unreasonable "search" even though nothing was
511 (Neb. 1976) (police looking from a neighboring alley is a search). But see United
States v. Whaley, 779 F.2d 585 (11th Cir. 1986) (police looking through binoculars from
neighboring property is not a search).
115. 116 U.S. 616, 621 (1886). Thirty-six years after Boyd, Justice Brandeis stated that
the case "will be remembered as long as civil liberty lives in the United States." Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The Boyd case is best-
known for helping to give birth to the exclusionary rule of evidence. Because the items
that were the subject of the "search" were writings made by the defendants, the Court
ruled that this coerced disclosure violated both the Fourth Amendment's search and
seizure provision and the Fifth Amendment's right against self-incrimination. Boyd, 116
U.S. at 633. Thus the Court concluded-quite reasonably-that the invoices that were
acquired by the government could not be used at trial, since such use would be tantamount
to using the defendants' own improperly seized testimony against himself. Id. at 638.
Other cases then cited Boyd for the proposition that any evidence illegally acquired by the
government should be excluded from trial, even if the evidence was not of a "testimonial"
nature and thus no Fifth Amendment principles were at stake. See, e.g., Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925) (citing Boyd as authority to exclude cocaine from evidence
because of illegal search). See also Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles,
107 HARv. L. REv. 757, 787-88 (1994) (classifying the early exclusionary cases as part of
the now-discredited Lochner era: "a person has a right to his property, and it is
unreasonable to use his property against him in a criminal proceeding.").
116. See 18 Stat. 187 §5 (1874) ("if the defendant or claimant shall fail or refuse to
produce such book, invoice, or paper in obedience to such notice, the allegations stated in
the said motion shall be taken as confessed .... ").
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physically being searched: "It is true that certain aggravating
incidents of actual search and seizure, such as forcible entry into a
man's house and searching amongst his papers, are wanting... but it
accomplishes the substantial object of... forcing from a party
evidence against himself." '117
This emphasis on the result of the search rather than the method
of search ensured that the government could not acquire information
which was protected by the Fourth Amendment simply by avoiding
the traditional, physically invasive search. In Boyd, the government
attempted the "back door" of legal compulsion, but today
government agents have a far more efficient way of acquiring
protected information without a physically invasive search:
technology. When courts today consider the physically invasive
aspect of the intrusion in order to determine whether a "search" has
occurred, they are opening another back door for the government to
acquire previously protected information.
The concept of focusing on the result of the search and ignoring
the method re-emerges frequently throughout the next century of
case law. In the very first wiretapping case, Olmstead v. United
States,"'8 Justice Brandeis' dissent uses a result-oriented test in
analogizing wiretapping with reading the mail, declaring that "the
[Fourth] Amendment is violated by the officer's reading the paper
without a physical seizure, without even touching it,""9 and
concluding that in order to protect Fourth Amendment rights, "every
unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the
individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation
of the Fourth Amendment."2 ' Brandeis believed this results-oriented
analysis was necessary because, as he warned somewhat
prophetically:
The progress of science in furnishing the government with means of
espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some
day be developed by which the Government, without removing
papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by
which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate
occurrences of the home.
12
1
Twenty-four years later, Justice Murphy dissented in Goldman v.
United States'" and similarly suggested that the government's conduct
in any given search "may be wholly immaterial:"
There was no physical entry in this case. But the search of one's
117. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 622.
118. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
119. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
120. Id. (emphasis added).
121. Id. at 474.
122. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
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home or office no longer requires physical entry, for science has
brought forth far more effective devices for the invasion of a
person's privacy than the direct and obvious methods of oppression
which were detested by our forebears and which inspired the
Fourth Amendment. Surely the spirit motivating the framers of
that Amendment would abhor these new devices no less."
Justice Murphy also criticized the Olmstead opinion for focusing
on the method and not the result of the search, since it "keeps
inviolate the most mundane observations entrusted to the
permanence of paper but allows the revelation of thoughts uttered
within the sanctity of private quarters ....""'
Twelve years later in Silverman v. United States, -- which struck
down the "spike-mike" surveillance because it intruded on private
property interests-Justice Douglas concurred with a scathing attack
on the majority's reasoning. In comparing Silverman with Goldman,
Douglas points out that the "invasion of privacy is as great in one case
as in the other,, 126 and asks rhetorically: "[w]as not the wrong done in
both cases done when the intimacies of the home were tapped,
recorded, or revealed?"' ' He concludes with yet another incarnation
of a results-based test: "[T]he command of the Fourth Amendment
[should not] be limited by nice distinctions turning on the kind of
electronic equipment employed. Rather our sole concern should be
whether the privacy of the home was invaded."'"
As noted above, Harlan's concurrence in Katz appeared to be
following this line of reasoning, but due to the vagueness of its
language it did not clearly articulate that the method of the search
should no longer be considered by courts in evaluating whether a
search occurred. This lack of specificity in Katz has caused the
dissonance in the opinions we have seen since, and threatens to cause
more problems as technologies advance, as discussed infra in Part III.
C. The Caveat: Well-Established Technologies Can Change Reasonable
Expectations
If we are to completely ignore the conduct of the government
agent in determining whether or not a "search" occurred, what
elements do we consider in determining whether or not an
expectation of privacy is reasonable? Justice Murphy's dissent in
Goldman relied to a large extent on original intent-arguing that the
framers would never have countenanced the kind of "devices" that
123. Id. at 139 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 141.
125. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
126. Id at 512-13 (Douglas, J., concurring).
127. I. at 513.
128. Id. (emphasis added).
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enable government agents to eavesdrop on private conversations.
But it is too simple-and unrealistic-to argue that we should return
to the original intent and try to surmise what an eighteenth century
rural society considered to be a reasonable expectation of privacy.
There is obviously the standard problem faced by those who advocate
original intent; namely that of finding credible and uncontroverted
proof as to what eighteenth century society "believed" to be a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Even if this could be reliably
determined, modern-day crimes and the technological tools used to
commit them today-cell phones, computers, and so on-are so
different than those of two hundred years ago that many of the
"traditional" rules would be ineffective. But most importantly,
society itself has changed, so that what might seem to be a
"reasonable" search today would never have been accepted by
individuals in the 1780's. In other words, a workable test must be
flexible enough to change as society changes, but rigid enough to stay
constant even as technology changes. And technology-if it is widely
accepted by the public-can legitimately change society's
expectations about what kind of information is considered to be
public.
As an example, consider the technology of electric lights. At the
time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, it might easily be
argued that what a person did outdoors in the dark was reasonably
considered to be private. But electric lights have become so pervasive
and essential to our society that this expectation has changed. The
Supreme Court recognized this long ago in holding that the use of an
electric light did not constitute a "search.""' Other technologies may
not change society's expectations-for example, the ability to bug
telephones has been around for as nearly as long as the telephone
itself, and yet the content of a phone conversation is still considered
private information.
The "flyover" cases of Ciraolo and Riley also provide examples
of how new technologies can become so commonplace and affect
society so fundamentally that-at least in theory-they can change
people's conception of what areas are considered private.
129. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001) ("It would be foolish to
contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been
entirely unaffected by the advances of technology.") (citing the flyover cases as an
example of technology changing our conception of what areas are considered private).
130. See United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) ("Such use of a searchlight is
comparable to the use of a marine glass or a field glass. It is not prohibited by the
Constitution"). See also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730,740 (1983) ("[Tlhe use of artificial
means to illuminate a darkened area simply does not constitute a search, and thus triggers
no Fourth Amendment protection") (citing eight circuit court cases and seven state court
cases in support).
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Unfortunately, these cases also provide examples of how courts in
practice can abuse this flexibility beyond its intended function. The
Ciraolo court attempted to apply this theory of technologies changing
expectations when they held that the defendant did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in marijuana plants on his property
that were visible only from the air: "In an age where private and
commercial flight in the public airways is routine, it is unreasonable
for respondent to expect that his marijuana plants were
constitutionally protected.. .'... 31 The Court's reasoning in reaching
this conclusion is suspect, however-essentially the Court held that
because "[a]ny member of the public flying in this airspace who
glanced down could have seen everything [the] officers observed,'
132
all areas that are visible from public airspace are therefore no longer
private. Here the Court conflates what modern technology has made
possible (which by itself does not change what society views as public
or private) with how modern technology has changed society (and
thus changed reasonable expectations of privacy). Although it is now
possible for law enforcement officials-or the general public-to fly
in the air and observe the activities in private backyards, the practice
is hardly considered routine and commonplace. 33 A contrast can be
made to the use of electric lights at night-not only is it now possible
for law enforcement officials and the general public to observe
outdoor nighttime activities (in a way that was not contemplated in
the 18'h century), but it is also so commonplace that society arguably
no longer considers such activities private.
This distinction between what new technologies make possible
and what new technologies have made commonplace is even sharper
in a subsequent flyover case, in which the Court held that
observations made from a helicopter hovering at 400 feet were
legitimate because "[a]ny member of the public could legally have
been flying over [defendant's] property in a helicopter at the altitude
of 400 feet.""' As noted above,"5 this reasoning improperly considers
whether the government was violating state or federal law when
conducting the surveillance-a factor which Katz should have
banished altogether. But more subtly, it assumes that society's
expectations have changed just because a new technology has made it
possible for the public to make certain observations, without pausing
to consider whether or not such observations are in fact occurring
131. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,215 (1986).
132. Id at 213-14.
133. As the Ciraolo dissent noted, "the actual risk to privacy from commercial or
pleasure aircraft is nonexistent." Id. at 223 (Powell, J., dissenting).
134. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445,451 (1989).
135. See supra notes 58, 59 and accompanying text.
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often enough to make the defendant's expectation of privacy
"unreasonable. 136
Given this context, the methods-based "caveat" that the Kyllo
court added to its result-oriented test seems more sensible. As noted
above," Kyllo stated that the use of technology to observe activity or
details that would otherwise be unobservable without physical
intrusion was a search, but only if "the Government uses a device that
is not in general public use."' The opinion itself goes into very little
detail about why the caveat is included or-more importantly-how
to determine whether a given technology is "in general public use." '' 9
The dissent argued that thermal imagers of the kind used by the
government in Kyllo are available to the public, and over 10,000 units
had been manufactured.4 ' The majority provided a cursory response
to this point by quoting Ciraolo's description of commercial flight as
being "routine," and credibly stating that "thermal imaging is not
'routine....... Of course, "routine" is not the same as "in general
public use"-technologies such as helicopters, night vision goggles,
supercomputers, and arguably thermal imagers may be "in general
public use," but none of them are "routinely" used the way personal
computers, telephones, binoculars, and walkie-talkies could be
considered routine. And neither term conveys (though "routine"
comes closer) what the court probably meant to convey: that if a
technology becomes so widespread and commonplace that it changes
societal expectations of privacy, its use is no longer considered a
"search."' 42
136. Thus, the Riley decision was faulty on two grounds: first, because it improperly
considered the method of search (noting repeatedly that the observation was made
"legally") and second, because it focused on what technology made possible, not on
whether or not technology had actually changed expectations. The Riley dissent was quick
to argue these two points as well, though it tended to conflate the two fallacies:
The question before us must be not whether the police were where they had a
right to be, but whether public observation of Riley's curtilage was so
commonplace that Riley's expectation of privacy in his backyard could not be
considered reasonable. To say that an invasion of Riley's privacy from the skies
was not impossible is most emphatically not the same as saying that his
expectation of privacy within his enclosed curtilage was not one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable.
Riley, 488 U.S. at 460 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
137. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
138. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,40 (2001).
139. And as noted in supra note 86, the dissent notes that thermal imagers of the kind
used by the government in Kyllo are available to the public, and over 10,000 units had
been manufactured. Id. at 47 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140. See supra note 86.
141. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 39 n.6.
142. The Kyllo case was obviously struggling with how to craft a results-based search
that would remain flexible enough to adapt as technology changed society. The primary
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The point is that in saying the method of search is irrelevant, we
are not necessarily ignoring the dramatic effects that certain
technologies have had on society generally and our expectations of
privacy specifically. Courts can-and should-consider how
technology has changed society. However, courts must do so
carefully, always keeping in mind that the ultimate test is whether
technology has sufficiently changed society such that the area (or
item) in question is now one that is considered "public" in modern
society. Courts must resist the temptation to conclude that just
because a certain technology is available and the public could use it to
render once-private realms public, that in fact it has been used to
render them public. The Ciraolo and Riley Courts were unable to
resist this temptation; thus they applied the proper test, but they
applied it poorly, without considering the underlying reasons behind
the test. The Kyllo Court attempted to provide a caveat that would
take this factor into account, but the phrasing it used is likely to cause
more problems than it solves. The balancing act is admittedly
difficult, but it is essential. In applying a results-based test that
remains flexible enough to adapt to technological advances, courts
must not consider changes in technology, but rather how technology
changes society.
H1. Case Studies: Cybercrime, Sense-Enhancing Technologies,
and Binary Searches
A results-based application of the Katz test becomes increasingly
important as the method of searches becomes more technologically
language of its test, "obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding
the home's interior that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical
'intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,"' is too rigid and affords too much
protection-it would forbid the government from using electric lights or binoculars. Kyllo,
533 U.S. at 34. Indeed, the Court states that this test "assures preservation of that degree
of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted."
Id But of course that is not the goal, as the Kyllo Court itself noted one paragraph
earlier: "It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by
the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advances of technology." Id.
at 33-34.
Although very little of this question made its way into the final opinion, this was a
hotly debated question at Kyllo's oral arguments, as the Justices asked defendant's
attorney numerous questions regarding less-sophisticated technologies such as binoculars
and flashlights. Oral Argument at 22-23, 28-29, Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
At one point a Justice hypothesized a world in which "thermal imaging becomes very
common and every kid has a $5 thermal imager," and asked the defendant's attorney
whether that would change the reasonable expectation of privacy. Id at 23-24.
Predictably, the defendant's attorney answered in the negative, but under this article's
conception of the Katz test, such a dramatic change in society would and should change
the outcome of Kyllo.
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sophisticated. Specifically, three of the most difficult aspects of
search and seizure law today-computer searches and/or surveillance,
sense-enhancing technology, and binary or content-discriminatory
searches-suffer from lack of consistency because methods-based
factors still survive to varying degrees.
A. Investigations of Cybercrime and Other Computer-Related Offenses
(1) The Legacy of Smith v. Maryland
The difficulty in applying the Fourth Amendment to computer
searches and surveillance can be traced to Smith v. Maryland,14 3 a case
from 1979 that had nothing to do with computers. In Smith, the
police (without obtaining a warrant) asked the phone company to
install a "pen register"-which records all phone number dialed out
from a given telephone-on the defendant's phone. The pen register
revealed that the defendant made a phone call to the victim, a woman
whose car had been stolen and who had been receiving numerous
obscene phone calls from a man claiming to be the robber. Based on
this information, the police obtained a warrant and searched the
defendant's home, which resulted in further incriminating evidence."M
At trial, the defendant moved to suppress the use of the "pen
register" (and the fruits thereof), claiming that the police had
conducted a "search" when they acquired the phone numbers that he
dialed, and the trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court
ultimately agreed, holding that the defendant had neither a subjective
nor an objective expectation of privacy in the phone numbers that he
dialed.46
The Smith Court claimed to be using the Katz test as its
"lodestar," and appropriately sought to determine whether or not the
information that the government acquired-the phone numbers the
defendant had dialed-was information that society considered to be
private.47 In doing so, however, the Court spent almost no time
considering the nature of the information itself,1 and instead focused
on the fact that the defendant had "voluntarily" turned the
supposedly private information over to a third party, i.e., the phone
143. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
144. Id at 737.
145. Id. at 737-38.
146. Id. at 742-43.
147. Id at 739-40.
148. The Court conducts a brief examination of the nature of the item being
"searched," noting that pen registers do not record the contents of the phone call, but this
analysis is only meant to demonstrate that the facts of the case are not identical to those of
Katz; that a pen register is different enough from a microphone to require independent
consideration. Id. at 741-42.
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company. '49 The Court thus placed dialed phone numbers in the same
category as statements made to an informer' 5 -information which an
individual makes available to a third party and in which an individual
therefore no longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy."'
This analogy between freely making statements to an individual
who may or may not be an informer and communicating the phone
numbers that you dial to the phone company as a necessary function
of using a phone is dubious. The dissent in Smith noted that in the
informer cases, the Court relied on the doctrine of "assumption of
risk," which implies some "freedom of choice" on the part of the
individual. 2 But no such choice is involved when one uses the
telephone-essentially, the Court is ruling that everyone who uses the
telephone is waiving his or her right to privacy in the phone numbers
he or she is dialing.
Viewed in this light, Smith's overly formalist analysis looks
suspiciously like a method-of-search analysis dressed up in disguise.
Certainly if a person chooses to give information to a third party, the
government can credibly argue that the nature of the information has
changed; it is no longer private, and society no longer recognizes an
individual's expectation that it will be kept secret. Thus, allowing the
government to obtain such information without a warrant is
consistent with a results-based test: the result of the search is
information that is no longer considered private. But when the Court
claims that information automatically enters the public arena without
the individual taking any action at all (aside from creating the
information in the first place, i.e., dialing the telephone), there is no
realistic argument that the information thus automatically becomes
public. Instead, when the Court applies the third-party doctrine to
such information, it is engaging in a methods-based analysis-the
government did not place a device on a person's phone nor spy on the
individual dialing the phone; instead, it merely asked the phone
company for records that were already kept in the ordinary course of
business. This sanitized method of search apparently makes it more
palatable-but we have seen that argument before: in Boyd when the
government sought to gain private information through subpoena; in
149. Id. at 744 ("When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical
information to the telephone company and 'exposed' that information to its equipment in
the ordinary course of business.").
150. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373
U.S. 427 (1963).
151. The Court had also placed financial information given to a bank in this category.
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). The Court later added garbage left on the
curb for the sanitation department. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
152. Smith, 442 U.S. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the line of now-discredited cases upholding phone tapping and
eavesdropping; and finally in Katz, where it was firmly rejected.
This is not to say that the holding of Smith is wrong; it may well
be that the phone numbers a person dials are not something that
society is prepared to recognize as private information. But
answering this question requires more than a finding that this
information is capable of being recorded by a third party. It would
require an analysis of the information itself. Do we generally believe
that the identities of the people that we communicate with is private
information? 53 If the telephone did not exist, individuals would have
to physically travel to other people's homes, or to public meeting
places, and this activity could presumably be monitored by
government agents without violating the Fourth Amendment. When
individuals communicate by mail, the Fourth Amendment clearly
allows the government to observe to whom the envelopes are
addressed as the mail is sent through the system."M All of these
factors point towards allowing the government to use a pen register
without a warrant-but none of these factors were considered by the
Smith Court.
The most unfortunate aspect of Smith involves a short paragraph
near the end of the opinion, seemingly of little importance at the
time. The defendant noted that he had never actually revealed the
phone numbers to a live person; they had merely been recorded by
the phone company's "automatic switching equipment." The Court
rejected this argument in broad terms, and held that "revealing"
information to an automated system was the same as revealing it to
an individual.55
Given the technological revolution that has occurred in the
twenty-three years since Smith was decided, this doctrine is now
153. Since Smith was decided, a number of technological advances (such as Caller I.D.)
have become prevalent enough that society's expectations may have changed as to the
privacy a person should receive in the phone numbers that he or she dials. A modem-day
Supreme Court re-examining Smith should take this into account as well. See generally
supra notes 126-142 and accompanying text on how technology can change society's
expectations of privacy.
154. This principle was first settled over 120 years ago, in Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727
(1877) (any information available without opening the mail (size of package, name of
sender and receiver, etc.) is available to the government without a warrant).
155. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744-45. In fact, the telephone company's system did not
automatically record every phone number that was dialed in, only those necessary for
billing purposes (such as long-distance numbers) or those requested by the government
(for example, in tracing obscene phone calls). Even so, the Court held that the mere fact
that a third party could be receiving this information meant that under the law defendant
had voluntarily given this information to a third party: "Regardless of the phone
company's election [to record or not to record specific numbers], petitioner voluntarily
conveyed to it information that it had facilities for recording and that it was free to
record." Id. at 745.
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problematic, to say the least. Taken literally, this rule would give the
government the power to monitor every piece of electronic mail that
is sent through the internet, since every electronic transmission that is
sent from one person to another travels through numerous switching
computers, each of which are independent third parties and any of
which have the capability of recording the addresses and the content
of the transmissions. As noted infra,15 the Smith case-like all
computer-related Fourth Amendment jurisprudence-has been
largely supplanted by statute, but the constitutional problem remains
waiting beneath the surface.
(2) The ECPA and the Fourth Amendment in Computer Surveillance-The
Need to Distinguish Among Content
The past twenty years have seen a revolution in communications
technology comparable to that of the telephone-and subsequently a
revolution in communications surveillance technology comparable to
the electronic listening device or the phone tap. Technology now
makes it possible for law enforcement agents located literally
anywhere in the world to easily and conveniently read electronic
communications between two parties, in the same way that electronic
listening devices and wiretaps made it easier to eavesdrop on oral
communications from remote locations. Perhaps even more
dramatically, the advent of the new communications medium gives
law enforcement officers the ability to scan through literally millions
of electronic communications every minute, searching for
incriminating content or addresses in a way that was inconceivable for
traditional mail. And as with the wiretapping and electronic
surveillance technologies, these searches can occur without the
knowledge of the individual under surveillance.
As we have seen, the judicial response to the new surveillance
technologies of the early twentieth century took many decades to
evolve into a model that recognized the realities of the new
technology. Perhaps as a result, after Katz, Congress began taking
matters into its own hands, first with regards to oral and electronic
communications, and then with regard to electronic communications.
In 1967, the Supreme Court held in Katz that the use of
electronic listening devices was a "search," and held in Berger v. New
York..7 that wiretapping a telephone could be a "search." The next
year, Congress passed the Wiretap Act of 1968, ubiquitously known
as "Title III.""' This Act sets out strict rules for government
monitoring of oral and wire communications: before the government
156. See infra Part III.A.2.
157. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
158. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510-22 (2000).
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can use a bug or wiretap a phone, it has to acquire a court order (a
"Title III order"). The requirements for such an order are more
onerous than what would be required under the Fourth Amendment:
the government must demonstrate that (1) "normal investigative
procedures" have been tried and failed, are unlikely to succeed, or
are dangerous; (2) probable cause that the specific communications
facility is being used in a crime; (3) the surveillance will be conducted
in a way that minimizes the interception of irrelevant information; (4)
there is probable cause to believe that the interception will reveal
evidence of one of a limited list of predicate crimes. In addition, the
original legislation required the order to be signed by a federal judge
and authorized by a high-level Department of Justice official. l
Finally, any Title III order is time-limited to thirty days, although the
161government can request an extension.
In the case of oral communications, the statute tracked the Katz
language and only protected conversations in which an individual had
a "reasonable expectation of privacy;"' 62 however, in the case of wire
communications there was no such limitation,' 6 presumably because
Congress assumed that every "wire communication" (i.e., phone call)
was private and thus deserved full statutory protection.1 64
In 1986, Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act ("ECPA") which amended Title III to include protections for
electronic communications. The language of the ECPA tracked the
"wire communication" provisions, setting the same high requirements
for all electronic communications, regardless of whether there was a
"reasonable expectation of privacy" in the communication. At least
one commentator has criticized this omission, since internet traffic
now includes not just private, personal communications but also
"[w]eb pages in transit, commands sent to remote servers, picture or
music files, network support traffic, and almost everything else in
cyberspace. ' '  In this sense, statutory protection for electronic
communications is too broad, treating all internet traffic as deserving
of an equal amount of protection and thus forcing government agents
159. Id § 2518.
160. Id. § 2516.
161. Id.
162. See id § 2510(2).
163. See id § 2510(1).
164. See Orin S. Kerr, Are We Overprotecting Code? Thoughts on First-Generation
Internet Law, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1287, 1299-1300 (2000) (tracing the legislative
history of Title III and the ECPA).
165. Id. at 1300. In this sense, statutory protection for electronic communications is too
broad, forcing government agents to acquire a Title III order for even the most mundane
transmissions that would not deserve privacy under the Katz test.
[Vol. 53
to acquire a Title III order for even the most mundane transmissions
that would not deserve privacy under the Katz test.'
But if the ECPA is overbroad in that it treats every piece of
internet traffic the same without discriminating as to its content,
under Smith the Fourth Amendment has the opposite problem for the
same reason. Under Smith, any time an individual "voluntarily"
conveys information to a third party in the course of a conversation,
and that third party has "facilities for recording" the information, the
government can acquire that information from the third party without
infringing on the individual's Fourth Amendment rights-without
regard to society's actual expectation of privacy in the specific
transmission that is being made.67 This is significant because while
Government agents who violate the ECPA can be civilly or even
criminally liable (though good faith and qualified immunity defenses
may apgly),168 there is no statutory suppression remedy for the
ECPA.' Thus, any electronic communications that are acquired in
violation of the statute are admissible unless the search also violated
the Fourth Amendment.
We saw that in the context of a telephone communication, the
argument that the individual "chose" to reveal the phone numbers he
or she is dialing to a third party was more or less a formalist construct,
since phone companies have the ability to electronically record every
phone number that is dialed from any telephone. In the context of
electronic communications, this formalism becomes even more
strained, since electronic communications might pass through dozens
of servers and Internet Service Providers ("ISP's") before they reach
their destination. The supposedly "results-based" test in Smith-that
166. Since the ECPA was passed in 1986, the internet has grown in use so dramatically
that nearly every kind of interaction, transaction, or communication that could occur in
the outside world can now occur in cyberspace as well. Thus, applying the Title III
restrictions to every internet-based search would be the equivalent of requiring a warrant
under the Fourth Amendment for observing or monitoring every kind of interaction or
transaction in the real world: "Much like human behavior in realspace, electronic
behavior in cyberspace is too varied to fit within a single paradigm. One-size-fits-all
doesn't work." Id. (citations omitted).
167. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 745.
168. See 18 U.S.C. §2520(d) ("[a] good faith reliance on... a court warrant or order...
or a statutory authorization... is a complete defense against any civil or criminal action
brought under this chapter or any other law"); Tapley v. Collins, 211 F.3d 1210, 1216 (11th
Cir. 2000) (allowing a qualified immunity defense in an action filed for violations of Title
III). For an excellent overview of these subjects see generally COMPUTER CRIME &
INTELL. PROP. SECTION, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUST, SEARCHING AND SEIZING
COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
120-26 (2001). (hereinafter DOJ MANUAL).
169. See DOJ MANUAL, supra note 168, at 120; Steve Jackson Games v. U.S. Secret
Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 461 n.6 (5th Cir. 1994). There is a statutory suppression remedy under
Title III for oral and wire communications. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (2000).
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acquiring such information does not violate the Katz test because the
result (the information acquired) has been voluntarily offered up to
the public-is nonsensical. In reality such searches would be allowed
under Smith because the government action in acquiring the
information-taking it off an anonymous server-is less offensive
than invading a person's private computer files. A true results-based
test would focus on the information itself-was it a piece of electronic
mail (which would surely deserve complete Fourth Amendment
protection given the precedents for traditional mail);17 was it a
financial transaction sent from one company to another company
(which may deserve less protection); or a message sent to an internet
chat room (which truly has been offered up to the world and in which
society is not prepared to recognize a reasonable expectation of
privacy).
The ECPA tacitly acknowledges the anomalous outcome of
Smith's reasoning by setting a low standard for intercepting the
internet version of pen registers (as well as devices that record the
identity of incoming calls or messages, known as "trap and trace"
devices in the phone context).17' The "header" of an electronic mail
contains a "To" line, a "From" line, and a "Subject" line; thus, a
device that reads the header off an e-mail will not only acquire
information about the identity of the sender and receiver, but also
information about the content of the e-mail itself., 2 The ECPA quite
sensibly treats the "To" and "From" lines differently than the
"Subject" line-even though they are intercepted at the same time
and under Smith the sender has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in any of them (or in the rest of the message, for that matter). In
order to receive an order authorizing a "pen/trap" device for
monitoring the "To" and "From" lines of electronic transmissions,
government agents need only certify that the information that is likely
to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation." By
170. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) ("Letters and sealed packages of this
kind in the mail are as fully guarded from examination and inspection, except as to their
outward form and weight, as if they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their
own domiciles").
171. Compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2000) (protecting the content of oral, wire, and
electronic communications by requiring government agents to meet strict requirements
before being permitted to intercept such communications) with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27
(setting out much lower standards for orders which permit government agents to intercept
merely address information from internet communications).
172. See DOJ MANUAL, supra note 168, at 120.
173. 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b) (2000). See also DOJ MANUAL, supra note 168; United States
v. Fregoso, 60 F.3d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1995) (describing the judicial role in approving
such devices as "ministerial in nature").
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contrast, in order to read the "Subject" line, a government agent
would have to obtain a Title III order.74
Because the ECPA provides broader protection than the Fourth
Amendment in most instances,175  almost no cases involving
monitoring of electronic communications reach the Fourth
Amendment question. Therefore Smith's thinly veiled methods-
based test still stands as Fourth Amendment law. When courts do
address the extent to which the Fourth Amendment protects
electronic communications, a faithful application of the Katz test
would require them to avoid both the overbroad blanket protection
of the ECPA itself (which ignores the "reasonable expectations"
language of the Katz test)1 76 as well as the Smith application of Fourth
Amendment doctrine (which misinterprets the "reasonable
expectations" language). Instead, courts should consider the nature
of the information and the actions of the defendant regarding that
information in determining whether there is a "reasonable"
expectation of privacy in the information.
B. "Sense-Enhancing" Devices
Applying the Katz test to surveillance with sense-enhancing
devices poses serious challenges for a number of reasons. First, as we
saw in Kyllo, the very nature of these devices requires courts to
understand the distinction between an "intrusion" in the sense of a
physical invasion, and an "intrusion" in the sense of an improper
observation of private information. Sense-enhancing devices are
174. The "subject" line would be considered content and thus beyond the scope of a
pen/trap device.
175. As noted in supra note 165 and accompanying text, the ECPA not only protects a
broader range of internet traffic than would be protected under Katz, but also sets a
higher standard for a Title III order than what would be required for a warrant under the
Fourth Amendment. The only significant way in which the ECPA is less protective is that
it does not provide for a suppression remedy. See generally DOJ MANUAL, supra note
168, at 104-26.
176. Unfortunately there is some precedent from video surveillance cases for courts to
simply import the requirements and standards set by Title III (as amended by the ECPA)
into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Neither Title III nor the ECPA make any
mention of covert video surveillance, and so there is no federal statute regulating such
activities. Every court that has considered the issue agrees-unsurprisingly-that the
Fourth Amendment does apply to video surveillance, and every court so far has rather
inexplicably imported the language and requirements of Title III into the Fourth
Amendment, holding that video surveillance is constitutional provided it complies with
Title III. See United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504 (2d. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
827 (1986); United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536
(9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1005 (1992); United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674, 680
(8th Cir. 1994). For a spirited critique of this practice, see Koyomejian, 970 F.2d at 542-51
(Kozinski, J., concurring).
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popular because they are generally far less physically invasive, but
they have the potential to reveal a far greater amount of information
than more traditional searches. Thus, they may be less "intrusive" in
the first sense (which is irrelevant under the Katz test) and more
intrusive in the second sense (which goes directly to a results-based
analysis).
The confusion in this field stems from defining what is meant by
a "sense-enhancing device." Numerous courts and commentators
have distinguished between "sense-enhancing" devices that simply
magnify or improve existing senses (such as binoculars, flashlights, or
parabolic microphones) and "sense-replacing" devices that actually
detect or record information that is beyond any of our senses (such as
x-ray machines or thermal imagers).' This is a false dichotomy; as
Justice Harlan said about the physical trespass rule in Katz, the
distinction is "bad physics as well as bad law."'78 In terms of physical
science, the difference between "sense-enhancers" and "sense-
replacers" simply means distinguishing between a device that
enhances inputs (such as light waves or sound waves) which would be
detectable to us if they existed in greater magnitude, and inputs (such
as X-rays, ultraviolet waves, or radio waves) that our senses could
never detect no matter what their magnitude. Why this distinction
should have a legal significance is unclear. Consider, for example, the
thermal imager in Kyllo; by any meaningful scientific definition, it
merely enhances an input (heat) which we are able to detect on our
177. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 719-20 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
Unlike the electronic 'beeper' in Knotts, however, a dog [trained to react to the
smell of narcotics] does more than merely allow the police to do more efficiently
what they could [already] do using only their own senses. A dog adds a new and
previously unobtainable dimension to human perception. The use of dogs,
therefore, represents a greater intrusion into an individual's privacy.
Idt
Many commentators also use this categorization. See, e.g., David A. Harris,
Superman's X-Ray Vision and the Fourth Amendment: The New Gun Detection
Technology, 69 TEMP. L. REv. 1, 24 (1996).
[G]un detectors do not do what lights, telescopes, binoculars, and like devices
do-put police officers artificially closer or provide illumination enabling them to
observe what would be visible anyway but for distance or darkness. Rather, gun
detectors allow police to see what they never could .... Gun detectors do not so
much enhance police senses as they do replace them with something superhuman,
an ability to perceive that people simply do not have.
Id.
Other judges have come up with equally suspect classifications. See, e.g., United
States v. Bronstein, 521 F.2d 459, 464 (2d Cir. 1975) (Mansfield, J., concurring) (describing
a category of devices which "detect[] hidden objects without actual entry and without the
enhancement of human senses" including narcotics dogs, magnetometers, x-ray machines,
and microphones).
178. Katz, 389 U.S. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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own; yet it amplifies this input to such an extent that it provides
information about the activities inside the home that we could never
know merely by using our natural ability to detect heat. Why should
courts treat this differently from a device that can pick up inputs
completely undetectable to us (such as X-rays or neutrinos) as they
pass through the walls but gives the same picture of the interior of the
house? Consider also a dog trained to sniff for narcotics. Some
Justices considered this "technology" to be a "sense-replacer" since it
allegedly "adds a new and previously unobtainable dimension to
human perception."17 9 But other courts have appropriately pointed
out that this technology merely amplifies an input that we can already
detect; if the smell of cocaine were more powerful, a human being
could detect the contraband without relying on the dog."
As the foregoing analysis implies, the distinction is bad law
because it focuses on the method of search, rather than the result.
Assume a hypothetical case in which law enforcement agents enter
the defendant's property at night without a warrant. As the agents
make their way across the defendant's property using night-vision
goggles, the infrared sensors in the goggles allow them to detect a
large grove of marijuana plants that have been planted in an open
field approximately a half-mile away from the house. They then
approach the darkened house and remove their goggles. One of them
climbs a tree and then shines a flashlight into the second-floor
window of the house and observes bales of harvested marijuana
stacked against the wall of the room. The agents then acquire a
search warrant and return to confiscate both the marijuana growing
outside the house and the harvested marijuana inside the house.
A court considering the validity of these searches should not
(and probably would not) care which observations were made with
the "sense-replacing" night vision goggles and the "sense-enhancing"
flashlight; the relevant inquiry would focus on what kind of
information the agents observed and whether the defendant had a
reasonable expectation in keeping that information private. The
179. Place, 462 U.S. at 719 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Jones v. Latexo Indep.
Sch. Dist., 499 F. Supp.223, 232-33 (E.D. Tex. 1980) (dog "replaced rather than enhanced"
the school officials' perception since it "detect[ed] odors completely outside the human
sense of smell."); State v. Elkins, 354 N.E. 2d 716, 718 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976) (dog allows
officials to perceive "something entirely hidden from human senses, enhanced or
unenhanced.").
180. See, e.g., Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 477 (5th Cir.
1982) ("[T]he dog's olfactory sense merely 'enhances' that of the police officer in the same
way that a flashlight enhances the officer's sight."). See also United States v. Kelly, 128 F.
Supp. 2d 1021, 1024 (S.D. TX. 2001). Sometimes the courts use language that seems to put
canine sniffs in a middle category; see, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 747 F.2d 1359, 1367
(use of a dog is not a "mere improvement" of their sense of smell, but "a significant
enhancement accomplished by a different, and far superior, sensory instrument.").
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distinction between the unfenced marijuana field far from the house
and the stacks of marijuana inside the private home carries great
constitutional significance;... the distinction between the type of
device should carry none. The same principle holds true in
comparing agents who observe a backyard from a distance using a
high-powered telescope with those who observe the same backyard
by installing a miniature video camera on an adjacent fence. It is the
area under observation (as well as the actions taken by the defendant
to ensure its privacy) that is relevant, not the type of technology used
to conduct the observation.
As noted above, Kyllo has gone a long way to clarifying this area
of law. The government in Kyllo essentially argued that thermal
imagers were merely sense-enhancing and thus fundamentally
different from a sense-replacing device that could see through the
wall. The Court, however, made clear that the type of technology
was irrelevant; whether they were reading inputs "off the wall" or
"through the wall."'
But this doctrine did not begin with Kyllo. In 1982, the Court
decided United States v. Knotts,' in which the government had
inserted an electronic tracer (called a "beeper") into a container of
chemicals purchased by the defendants. The government monitored
the beeper's location in order to follow the defendants as they drove
back to a secluded mountain cabin, and the Court held that following
the beeper's signal was not a "search" under the Fourth Amendment.
The critical aspect of the ruling was that the government only used
the tracer in order to locate the chemicals as they passed over public
highways. The Court noted that once the container reached the
defendant's cabin, the defendant enjoyed the traditional expectation
of privacy within a private dwelling place, and implied that if the
government had used the beeper to trace the container's movements
within the cabin, the defendant's rights may well have been violated."
In contrast, the government only used the tracer to determine where
181. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (no "search" takes place when
government agents trespass on property and observe items in an open field outside the
curtilage of the home). By contrast, observation of the inside of a home is deserving of the
highest level of Fourth Amendment protection. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S.
27, 37, (2001) ("In the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details, because the
entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.") (emphasis in original).
182. The government's opening argument began with the observation that "thermal
imaging senses heat gradients on the exterior of a surface. It does not penetrate the walls
of the house." (Oral Argument at 12-13,30, Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001)).
183. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35-36 (rejecting dissent's "mechanical" distinction between
"off-the-wall" and "through-the-wall" technologies).
184. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
185. Id. at 282.
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the container was transported over a "public highway" or its
movements in the "open fields" outside the cabin.1 6
The electronic tracer in Knotts, like the thermal imager in Kyllo,
was a "sense-replacing" device-it emitted radio waves that could
only be detected by a special receiver." But again the Court focused
not on the method the police used, but the result: the information
they obtained was information that was open to the public; i.e., where
the defendant drove on the public highways and where he placed the
container outside his cabin in public view. Given the Court's
argument in Knotts, any kind of technological enhancement would
have been appropriate, as long as it revealed only "publicly
observable" information. In other words, the government could have
attached a video camera to the container to show where it was being
taken-as long as the agents stopped monitoring the camera once it
was taken into a private place."
186. Id.
Visual surveillance from public places along [co-defendant] Petschen's route or
adjoining Knott's premises would have sufficed to reveal all of these facts to the
police. The fact that the officers in this case relied not only on visual
surveillance, but also on the use of the beeper to signal the presence of
Petschen's automobile to the police receiver, does not alter the situation.
Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the
sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science
and technology afforded them in this case.
Id.
187. Although because it was only used in this case to detect what could theoretically be
seen, it was later described by Justice Brennan as a "sense-enhancing" device: "Unlike the
electronic 'beeper' in Knotts, however, a dog [trained to react to the smell of narcotics]
does more than merely allow the police to do more efficiently what they could [already]
do using only their own senses." United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,719 (1983) (Brennan,
J., concurring). Of course, the device itself did much more than "merely allow the police
to do more efficiently what they could [already] do using only their own senses[.]" The
Supreme Court had properly limited the use of the device so that it could only be used to
transmit information that was available to their senses, i.e., so that it only could be used to
transmit information in which the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy.
188. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285.
A police car following [co-defendant] Petschen at a distance throughout his
journey could have observed him leaving the public highway and arriving at the
cabin owned by respondent, with the drum of chloroform still in the car. This
fact, along with others, was used by the government in obtaining a search warrant
which led to the discovery of the clandestine drug laboratory. But there is no
indication that the beeper was used in any way to reveal information as to the
movement of the drum within the cabin, or in any way that would not have been
visible to the naked eye from outside the cabin:
Id. See also United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1999), in which defendant's
growing of marijuana in a national forest was caught by motion-activated video camera.
There, the Court of Appeals upheld defendant's conviction: "Illegal activities conducted
on government land open to the public which may be viewed by any passing visitor or law
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Thus, Knotts and Kyllo demonstrate that, although the
terminology occasionally becomes confused, and certain Justices do
try to distinguish between types of sense-enhancing devices, in the
end the Court has appropriately treated all sense-enhancing devices
alike and-consistent with the Katz test-it has looked to the result
rather than the method of the search.
C. "Binary" Searches and Content-Discriminating Technologies
This Article has argued that applying the Katz test to consider
only the results and not the method of the search will help to ensure
that Fourth Amendment rights are protected even as technology
improves to give law enforcement more effective tools of surveillance
and investigation. For the most part, then, focusing on results and
ignoring the method of search will effectively broaden the reach of
the Fourth Amendment, ensuring that as technology improves, an
individual's zone of privacy does not diminish-unless technology
changes society to such an extent that reasonable expectations of
privacy are fundamentally altered. However, a results-based Katz
test will arguably favor law enforcement in a special category of
searches: so-called "binary" or content-discriminatory investigations,
in which the technology used is designed in such a way that the only
result of the investigation is information about whether contraband or
illegal activity is present.
So far only two Supreme Court cases have considered binary
investigations, and in each case the Court has upheld the government
action. In United States v. Place," 9 the Court held that the use of a
dog who only reacted to the presence of cocaine was not a "search,"
and in United States v. Jacobsen," the Court held that testing a
substance with a chemical that only reacted to the presence of
narcotics was also not a "search." These cases have always sat
uneasily alongside the other post-Katz cases. At first glance, they
seem to be the worst example of a methods-based approach-in
Place, for example the Court obviously found significance in the fact
that the search was not physically invasive.' How are such cases
different from any other sense-enhancing case, in which law
enforcement agents are able to use technology to learn about
otherwise private information in a non-invasive manner?
enforcement officer are not protected by the Fourth Amendment because there can be no
reasonable expectation of privacy under such circumstances." Id. at 1125-26.
189. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
190. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
191. Place, 462 U.S. at 707. ("A 'canine sniff' by a well-trained narcotics detection
dog.., does not require opening the luggage.") Later the Court notes that the "manner in
which the information is obtained" is limited. Id.
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The answer again comes from a closer consideration of the Katz
test and its underlying rationale. In defining the objective prong from
the Katz test, the Court has used the analogy of a "burglar plying his
trade in a summer cabin during the off-season," who may have a
subjective expectation of privacy, but not one which society
recognizes as legitimate." In other words, a person conducting an
illegal activity or possessing an illegal substance has no legitimate
interest in not having law enforcement agents learn of his illegality.
The problem, of course, is that in searching for illegal activity, law
enforcement agents will inevitably also observe or detect legal and
private activity.
If the police carried out nightly warrantless searches of
everyone's home, they would doubtless observe and recover quite a
bit of unlawful activity and contraband-but at the unacceptable cost
of exposing a vast amount of legitimate private activity and items to
an unreasonable search. But what if the police were able to detect
whether narcotics were present in a home or on a person merely by
pointing a specialized "narcotics detector" at the home or person?
Would the use of such an instrument constitute a "search?"
If the narcotics detector yielded no information other than the
absence or presence of an illegal substance, and it was close to 100%
accurate, Place and Jacobsen suggest strongly that using such a device
should not be considered a search. This conclusion also logically
follows from the results-based test advocated in this Article: if the
only "result" of the surveillance is the presence of illegal activity or
contraband-situations in which individuals do not have a legitimate
expectation of privacy-then conducting such a surveillance does not
constitute a search.'9
A close examination of the case law supports this analysis.
Although in Place the Court does consider the non-invasive nature of
the search on two occasions, it also relied upon the limited
information provided by the search: "[The search] does not expose
noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from
public view.., the sniff discloses only the presence or absence of
192. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,143-44 n.12 (1978).
193. To return to the analogy of the burglar in the summer cabin, the police would
obviously be prohibited from simply forcing their way into every summer cabin during the
off-season to look for burglars. However, if the burglar sets off an alarm, the police are
perfectly within their rights to enter the cabin and search for illegal activity-in this case
the alarm acts as a sort of "burglar detector," which will only react when there is illegal
activity occurring. Of course, police also have implied consent from the legitimate owner
to enter a home when the alarm has been triggered, which also insulates their actions from
impropriety. But the "binary search" of the alarm system at least intuitively makes their
search more justifiable.
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narcotics, a contraband item."'1 94 Ultimately, the Court implies that
both the physical invasiveness and the content of the information are
equally relevant to determining whether a search occurred, finding
that no search occurred in this case because the canine sniff "is so
limited both in the manner in which the information is obtained and
in the content of the information revealed by the procedure." '195 The
"method-based" prong of this test can and should be treated as an
unfortunate holdover from pre-Katz days, just like the analysis in
Bond and Riley.'96 As this Article has argued, this analysis is both
contrary to the spirit of Katz and dangerous to apply in an age of
increasingly superior technology. If the federal agents in Place had
been able to look through the sides of the defendant's suitcases with
special goggles to see all of the contents-i.e., not just the narcotics
but also the defendant's personal legitimate possessions-the
observation would and should have been deemed a "search" even
though the method used was less physically invasive than a canine
sniff.
The Court's only other binary search case, United States v.
Jacobsen,"" strongly supports this interpretation of Place. Not only
does the Court's analysis focus solely on the result of the search in
Jacobsen, it also re-visits Place and essentially repudiates the
methods-based prong of the test that was used in that case:
Respondents attempt to distinguish Place, arguing that it involved
no physical invasion of Place's effects, unlike the [government]
conduct at issue here. However.. .the reason [the canine sniff in
Place] did not intrude upon any legitimate privacy interest was that
the governmental conduct could reveal nothing about
noncontraband items.19
In other words, it was not the limited nature of the governmental
conduct in Place which immunized the canine sniff; it was the limited
amount of information which it could reveal.
In deciding Jacobsen itself, the Court applied a purely results-
based test: first noting that the field test "could disclose only one fact
previously unknown to the agent - whether or not a suspicious white
powder was cocaine."' The Court then reviewed the case law on
"legitimate expectation of privacy," noting that an expectation of
privacy for "wrongful" conduct is not one which society is prepared to
194. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
195. Id. (emphasis added).
196. See critique of Bond, supra note 67 and accompanying text; critique of Riley, supra
note 136 and accompanying text.
197. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
198. Id. at 124 n.24 (emphasis in the original).
199. Id. at 122.
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recognize as "reasonable." In this case, if the results of the test are
negative, "merely disclosing that the substance is something other
than cocaine-such a result reveals nothing of special interest."' If
the result is positive, the government has merely learned that the
defendant possesses narcotics, and "the interest in 'privately'
possessing cocaine [is] illegitimate."2" Thus, "governmental conduct
that can reveal whether a substance is cocaine, and no other arguably
'private' fact, compromises no legitimate privacy interest.' 2°3
Although the Court has not considered a binary-test case in
nearly twenty years, the implications for emerging technology are
obvious. To take an example from the computer world, the federal
government currently possesses an internet sifting device known as
"Carnivore," which, when placed on a server on the internet, will
store all e-mails passing through the server that are to or from a
certain individual. 4  The unfortunate name is actually meant to
represent an improvement in this technology: predecessors to
Carnivore merely stored all the e-mails without discrimination; now
the software is able to recognize and retain only those that originate
or are sent to a certain computer-thus, it only saves the "meat" and
lets the irrelevant (and thus less appetizing) e-malls pass through
unexaminedY25 Any sorting based on content, however, must be
conducted by a human being, who necessarily must read through
many legitimate, constitutionally (and statutorily) protected messages
before finding those which relate to the investigation.""
200. Id at 122-23 n.22 (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 n.12 (1978).)
201. Id- at 123.
202- Id
203. Id. (footnote omitted).
204. See E. Judson Jennings, Carnivore: U.S. Government Surveillance of Internet
Transmissions, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 10 at § 9 (2001) (citing Stephen P. Smith et. al., ILL.
INST. TECH. RES. INST., INDEP. REV. OF THE CARNIVORE SYS. §3.4.1 at 3-10 (2000)
[hereinafter IITRI Report]). Because analyzing each piece of data as it passes through
would disrupt the flow of information, Carnivore copies all of the internet traffic and then
searches through the copies it makes in order to determine which data packets are
relevant. These copies are stored, and the rest of the copied transmissions are deleted. As
the FBI has described the process: "Carnivore chews all the data on the network, but it
only actually eats the information authorized by the court order." Id.
205. Id. § 5.
206. See id- § 56 (citing IITRI Report, §3.2.3, at 3-5). Under Title III, oral, wire, or
electronic surveillance must be conducted "in a way that minimizes the interception of
irrelevant communication." See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2000). For example, in conducting a
wiretap, agents must monitor the wiretap continuously to ensure that irrelevant
conversations are not recorded. If a conversation occurs that is not covered by the Title
III order, the monitoring agent must shut off the recorder and allow the conversation to go
unrecorded. See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137-38 (1978) (holding that
courts should evaluate the monitoring agents' actions in minimizing the interceptions
under an objective reasonableness test, taking into account the facts and circumstances at
the time of the interception). In the context of Carnivore, the analogous procedure is the
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In order to monitor the electronic transmissions that are coming
to or from a certain individual, government agents must acquire a
court order.2 ' But consider an improved version of Carnivore-one
designed only to eat a very specific kind of meat-which did not filter
based on address but instead could sift through the content of all the
transmissions passing through the server to which it was attached and
copy only those which contained unambiguously illegal content:
pictures of child pornography, for example, or orders to transfer
funds in illegal amounts. Let us also assume that these transmissions
would be copied, but they would not be opened or read by human
beings without a warrant; thus, the only information that would result
from this monitoring of the internet would be that a given
transmission contained evidence of illegal activity. Under Place and
Jacobsen, this device would not be conducting a "search," since it
would only respond-like the trained dog or the chemicals in the field
test-when there was unambiguous evidence of illegal activity, and it
would report nothing other than the presence or absence of that
activity. Applying a purely results-based test would lead a court to
the same result as following Place; namely, that no search occurred.
Granted, the method may seem oppressive-essentially warrantless
monitoring of every transmission on the internet-but under Katz
there are no Fourth Amendment implications because the only
possible results of the surveillance do not infringe on legitimate
expectations of privacy.
Outside of the computer context, sense-enhancing technologies
could also be designed so as only to respond when there was
unambiguous evidence of a crime. Devices could be created that
could "detect the odor of deadly bacteria or chemicals for making a
new type of high explosive, '" and could be used indiscriminately-
case agent searching through all the retained e-mails from the target and deleting all of the
messages that are not covered by the Title III order. Some commentators have thus
criticized Carnivore as overbroad, since all e-mails, relevant and irrelevant are retained,
unlike the wiretap setting where the recorder is turned off. See, e.g., Jennings, supra note
204, § 57 (concluding that "the FBI's system depends essentially on a case agent who will
'immediately' review several hundred megabytes of data, determine which information is
'relevant,' and permanently discard the rest.") (citations omitted). This problem is
apparently the result of the design of Carnivore, which cannot filter for text if it is already
filtering for addresses. See id. § 23 (noting that "a [Carnivore] search keyed to a particular
email address ignores the text filter") (citations omitted).
207. Either a Title III order (if the use of Carnivore represents an "interception" of
electronic transmissions); or a search warrant under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (if the use of
Carnivore represents a reading of stored communications).
208. United States v. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27, 47-48 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens expressed concern in his dissent that the Kyllo test would preclude using devices
that could detect obvious contraband, such as the dog in Place, since such devices would
reveal more than could otherwise be seen without physical invasion. However, since the
Court in Jacobsen essentially held that there is no legitimate privacy interest in possessing
provided they did not reveal any further information about the area
or person that they scanned. Small portable gun detectors are already
being used by law enforcement agents throughout the country; if
designed so that they reported only the presence or absence of a gun,
and if only used in circumstances in which possession of a gun were
clearly illegal, these devices could also be used on individuals without
a warrant.
Although the constitutionality of such observations logically
follows from applying a results-based test, this conclusion is
controversial for two reasons, one doctrinal and the other practical.
The doctrinal objection attacks one of the premises of the argument:
that those engaged in illegal activity are not entitled to a legitimate
expectation of privacy. Although the Supreme Court has supported
this premise in Place and Jacobsen, some Justices and commentators
have resisted the idea that the government could use binary-search
devices indiscriminately.11
This objection collapses, however, when one considers the
extremely limited information provided by a truly binary search. For
example, Professor David Harris worries that allowing the
illegal substances, the Court could easily harmonize the Kyllo test with the Place doctrine
by confirming that Kyllo only applies to areas, activities and items in which an individual
has a legitimate expectation of privacy. The specific language used in Kyllo already
implies this, since it limits the test to "details of the home," which clearly deserve
constitutional protection.
209. See generally Harris, supra note 177, at 5-14.
210. Meeting the second criteria may be a formidable challenge, however, given the
proliferation of new laws easing restrictions on acquiring a permit to carry a handgun. As
of 1995, twenty-five states allowed adults with a permit to carry concealed firearms. See
Harris, supra note 177 at 56-57, 57 n.309; see also infra note 222 and accompanying text.
211. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 136-43 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that courts should always look to the context in which an item is concealed, not
the identity of the concealed item). See also Michael Adler, Note, Cyberspace, General
Searches, and Digital Contraband: The Fourth Amendment and the Net-wide Search, 105
YALE LJ. 1093, 1110-11 (1996) (claiming that scanning citizens at random with such
devices would violate their "right to be let alone"); Harris, supra note 177, at 41 (it is
"flawed" to ignore the conditions and circumstances of the search and focus only on the
discriminating method). But see Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device
for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1245-46 (1983) (detecting presence or
absence of contraband does not violate the Fourth Amendment); Harris, supra note 177,
at 43-44 n.240 (Professor Wayne LaFave argues that police need not have probable cause
to use a "gun detector" that only conveys information about whether or not a person is
armed in a context in which being armed is illegal) (citing letter from Wayne LaFave,
Professor, University of Illinois College of Law, to David A. Harris, Professor, University
of Toledo College of Law (Aug 18, 1995) (on file with Professor Harris)); Professor
Christopher Slobogin also agreed with Professor LaFave's analysis, see id. (citing letter
from Christopher Slobogin, Professor, University of Florida College of Law, to David A.
Harris, Professor, University of Toledo College of Law (Sept. 5, 1995) (on file with
Professor Harris)).
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warrantless use of devices as long as they are "unintrusive and
discriminating" would result in a Fourth Amendment that would
progressively weaken as technology improved.2 As noted above, this
is indeed a critical concern in modern society, and the primary reason
that the method of the surveillance should not matter in determining
whether a search has occurred. But Professor Harris ends up
conflating content discrimination with broader methods-based
considerations (such as "intrusiveness"), and thereby conjures up a
society where law enforcement can conduct "visual observation" of
items inside a house.213 Of course, a truly binary search could never
be a "visual observation"-it would only provide the law enforcement
agent with a "yes" or a "no"-and, as the Supreme Court noted in
Jacobsen, neither answer implicates any legitimate expectation of
privacy. 214
But this first objection highlights the importance of the second
objection, which focuses on how binary tests might work in practice.
In an ideal world, law enforcement officials would design devices that
(1) only produced a binary response when used and conveyed no
other information about the person or area searched; (2) were 100%
accurate; and (3) that only responded when the individual possessed
an item-narcotics, firearms, child pornography, etc.-that was
clearly illegal. 5 In reality, such perfect devices might be difficult, if
not impossible, to create (though a child-pornography-sniffing
Carnivore might be quite feasible). Neither Place nor Jacobsen
undertook an examination as to the accuracy of the binary search; the
Place Court merely noted that the dog was a "trained narcotics
212. Id. at 43.
213. Id. at 44.
214. Opponents of warrantless binary searches offer up a weaker objection to the
premise, namely that a search cannot be justified after the fact merely because it resulted
in the finding of contraband. See, e.g., Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 140 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("[T]he Court [in Place and Jacobsen] has ignored the fundamental principle that a search
prosecuted in violation of the Constitution is not made lawful by what it brings to light")
(citations and quotations omitted); Harris, supra note 177, at 41 ("It seems almost too
basic a proposition to restate, but what police find as a result of a search can play no part
in determining whether the officers violated the Fourth Amendment in conducting the
search."). This objection misses the point entirely; a binary search is not constitutional
because of what it does find, but because of what it is capable offinding. Under Place and
Jacobsen-and under the results-based interpretation of the Katz test-a binary search is
incapable of revealing any information that deserves a legitimate expectation of privacy.
215. Just a few months before Place was decided, Professor Arnold H. Loewy
hypothesized just such an "evidence-detecting divining rod" which could be used by police
indiscriminately to locate contraband. See Loewy, supra note 211, at 1244. As real-life
(and thus imperfect) examples of such "divining rods," Professor Loewy put forward drug-




detection dog" that reacted "positively" to one of the bags; a
footnote in Jacobsen simply states that lijuids in the test will take on
certain colors when cocaine is present. " Since these precedents
implicitly assume (whether correctly or not)218 100% accuracy from
the binary search in question, they provide little guidance about
analyzing cases in which the accuracy of the device might be less than
perfect.
If binary searches do become more common (as they are likely
to, given their constitutionality under Place and their growing
feasibility as technology improves), courts will have to define how
close devices must come to reaching all three of the above criteria in
order to be considered a true binary search device. In order to satisfy
the first criterion, technology will have to be created that can
automatically sift through images or other input which may reveal too
much information and mechanically determine whether the
information contains evidence of contraband. For example, some
current models of gun detectors produce a grainy picture of dark
metallic objects showing up against a gray outline of the body and
rely on the user's expertise to determine whether the outline
represents a weapon,219 but because this imparts more information
than a mere "yes" or "no" to the operator, it cannot be considered a
binary search. Any attempt to create an improved version of
Carnivore will meet with the same problem
Unfortunately, in automating the evaluative aspect of the search,
there is a good chance that the device will become less accurate, thus
creating problems with the second criterion. In other words, a trained
law enforcement officer is probably better than a pre-programmed
algorithm in determining whether an image of a metal object is a
firearm; likewise, a human being is probably better equipped than a
software program in determining whether an image is child
pornography." Thus the problem of false positives is likely to
216. See Place, 462 U.S. at 699. The concurrence does note that the District Court
found the dog search had been conducted in a way that avoided a "tainted reaction from
the dog." IL at 723 n.3 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
217. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 112 n.1.
218. Obviously, drug-sniffing dogs are not 100% accurate, and in some cases can be
wildly inaccurate. In Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), modified by 631
F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981), a dog was employed to sniff all
2,763 students in a school. The dog found fifty "positives," but only seventeen of those
fifty were in possession of contraband. This translates inco a respectable 1.2% false-
positive rate (33 false positives out of the 2,780-student sample), but a rather poor positive
predictive value of 34% (defined as the thirty-three innocent students out of the fifty
positive responses).
219. See Harris, supra note 177, at 11-12.
220. Justice Potter Stewart's famous definition of obscenity, "I know it when I see it,"
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring), probably works only
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increase as the devices are altered to become truly binary devices.
What percentage of accuracy is necessary to survive constitutional
scrutiny (95%? 99%?) is a difficult question.
This question is further complicated by the third criterion-how
likely is it that the item that is detected is illegal? At least one critic
of binary searches has concluded that if the item being detected is not
certain to be contraband, the binary search doctrine might not apply
at all."~ Even if the binary search doctrine does apply, the chance that
the item being detected might be legal in this context must be
factored into the technical accuracy of the device. For example, if a
gun detector is 95% accurate, but 20% of the guns it detects are
possessed lawfully, the device only accurately detects an illegal item
72% of the time.
How courts will balance these criteria is yet to be seen. But
given the legal and technical confluence of factors (that is, an
established constitutionality of binary searches combined with the
advent of computer "sniffers" such as Carnivore and sophisticated
sense-enhancing technologies such as gun detectors), law
enforcement agents are almost certain to utilize binary search devices
more and more frequently in the future. Justice Brennan's
hypothetical in his Jacobsen dissent no longer sounds like science
fiction: "[I]f a device were developed that could detect, from the
outside of a building, the presence of cocaine inside, there would be
no constitutional obstacle to the police cruising through a residential
neighborhood and using the device to identify all homes in which the
drug is present."=
for people and not computers; thus, what is an obvious and intuitive task for humans could
conceivably become a challenging task for software engineers.
221. See Harris, supra note 177, at 58 (citations omitted).
If one of the central underpinnings of [Place and Jacobsen] is that the method in
question detects only contraband, the new concealed weapons laws make for a drastically
different outcome. Simply put, under these laws concealed guns are not always
contraband. Therefore, applying the Place and Jacobsen reasoning would seem
questionable at best.
222. This concern is most applicable to gun detectors, since many people may carry
guns legally in a number of states. As of 1998, "[thirty-one] states have enacted 'shall
issue' laws, which require local law enforcement authorities to issue concealed-handgun-
carrying permits to any applicant who meets a set of specific criteria..." Jens Ludwig,
Concealed-Gun-Carrying Laws and Violent Crime: Evidence from State Panel Data, 18
INT'L REV. OF L. & ECON. 239, 240 (1998). In addition to the "shall issue" states, there
are a number of "may issue" states who allow citizens to carry concealed firearms under
more stringent requirements. As of 2002, forty-three states in the country had laws
allowing adults to carry concealed firearms with a permit. See
http://wwv.bradycampaign.org; www.packing.org (only Illinois, Kansas, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, and Wisconsin do not allow citizens to carry concealed
firearms).
223. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 138 (1924) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Justice Brennan later terms this scenario "Orwellian," 4 and
indeed it is chilling to imagine the police freely and indiscriminately
"scanning" all of our houses and our persons. But again, if one
considers the extremely limited nature of the information the police
receive with their scan-the presence or absence of illegal activity-
the instinctive reaction to such techniques seems misplaced. After all,
police already cruise down residential streets monitoring for criminal
activity in far less efficient ways: they listen for screams, gunshots,
threats, or other loud noises; they look for windows or doors that are
broken or inexplicably open; they might observe or even follow
"suspicious" actors for extended periods of time. In conducting all of
these activities, the police are intruding into our lives far more than
they would with a "narcotics detector," since the vast majority of
what they see and hear under traditional circumstances-the results
of their observations-has nothing to do with illegal activity. Once
again, when one considers the results of such binary searches-even
on a widespread scale-and compares them to the results of normal
police activity, they fit comfortably within Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.'
Conclusion
In deciding Katz, the Supreme Court took a dramatic step
towards adopting a results-based test for applying the Fourth
Amendment to new technologies. However, the language in Katz
was sufficiently vague to muddle the distance that was traveled in that
step. This ambiguity has created a troubling dissonance in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. It is now time for courts to clarify the
mandate in Katz and confirm that the landmark case rendered
irrelevant any consideration of the methods used in government
surveillance. This clarification is becoming only more critical as
technology continues to advance, allowing law enforcement officials
access to more and more intimate information without any physical
intrusion-and indeed without the target's knowledge. We must
learn from the absurdity in the case law before Katz, and at the same
time consider the implications of the surveillance technologies which
will become more ubiquitous as time progresses. In this way both the
224. Id
225. A slightly related objection might be constructed around the many laws that are
still on the books but never enforced or enforced halfheartedly in many jurisdictions-
laws prohibiting the use of marijuana, for example, or sodomy laws. But this objection
ultimately would be attacking the efficiency of such searches, not their intrusiveness; if it is
troubling to people that, say, a "marijuana detector" would make it impossible for anyone
to smoke marijuana even in the privacy of their own home, the appropriate response, of
course, is to amend the law which makes marijuana illegal. See Loewy, supra note 211, at
1248 n.86.
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past and the future lead us to a better understanding of Katz-one
which looks beyond the method of the search.
